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REPUTATION THROUGH LITIGATION: 
HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM SHAPES BEHAVIOR BY 
PRODUCING INFORMATION 
Roy Shapira* 
Abstract: The law affects our behavior not only directly by imposing legal sanctions, but 
also indirectly, by providing information that shapes the reputations of individuals and 
organizations. This Article is the first to fully flesh out the reputation-shaping aspects of the 
law. 
The Article’s first major contribution is in explaining how reputation works. Legal 
scholars are increasingly recognizing that reputation matters: reputational concerns are touted 
as an important factor that shapes our behavior across a wide range of phenomena, from 
product safety to corporate governance to international relations. Yet so far the literature has 
stayed remarkably silent on how exactly reputation matters. This Article draws from a fast-
growing multidisciplinary body of reputation research to examine why similar behaviors lead 
to different reputational outcomes. A key takeaway is that reputational sanctions are much 
noisier than was previously acknowledged: the market systematically under-reacts to certain 
types of misbehaviors and over-reacts to others. 
The Article’s second major contribution comes from mapping out the different ways in 
which the law affects reputational sanctions. Specifically, the Article focuses on the 
previously overlooked “second-opinion role” of the law. When bad news breaks about an 
adverse action by a company, market players react immediately by downgrading their beliefs 
about the company and their willingness to interact with it. But the same bad news may also 
get the legal system involved. Then, in the process of finding out whether to impose legal 
sanctions, the legal system produces as a byproduct information on the behavior of the 
parties to the dispute: what top managers knew and when they knew it, whether the adverse 
action was an isolated mistake or whether it is indicative of the company’s operational 
culture, and so forth. This information reaches third parties, and makes them reassess their 
beliefs about the company. Contrary to the common assumption among legal scholars, law 
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and reputation are not independent of each other, but rather complement each other. A well-
functioning legal system reduces noise and increases the accuracy of reputational sanctions. 
Acknowledging the informational role of the law generates important policy implications. 
First, the Article calls for a more cautious approach to scaling back legal intervention. If the 
law indeed complements non-legal sanctions, then any proposal to scale back legal 
intervention should also take into account the expected negative impact on non-legal 
deterrence. Second, the Article reassesses practical and timely debates such as the desirability 
of heightened pleading standards. If litigation indeed generates quality information on the 
behavior of market participants (a positive externality), then we should reevaluate key legal 
institutions according to how they contribute to information production. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Reputation matters” is becoming the new mantra in the legal 
literature. Legal scholars increasingly refer to reputational concerns as 
important forces that shape our behavior across a wide range of 
phenomena: from product safety to corporate governance and the recent 
financial crisis to state compliance with international obligations.1 
Mounting empirical evidence shows just how real reputational sanctions 
can be: news about corporate misbehavior often brings with it declines 
in stock prices, in consumer willingness to pay, and in employee 
motivation.2 Yet so far the literature has stayed remarkably silent on how 
reputation matters, or how reputation interacts with the law.3 
This Article narrows the gap in our understanding of reputation by 
exploring the basic question of why similar behaviors lead to different 
reputational outcomes. The conventional approach assumes that 
whenever misconduct is revealed, the misbehaving 
                                                     
1. See, e.g., Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 1437 (2010) (reputation and product safety); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW 
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008) (reputation and international 
relations); JONATHAN R. MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION (2013) (reputation and 
the financial sector). 
2. See Jonathan M. Karpoff, Does Reputation Work to Discipline Corporate Misconduct?, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 361, 362, 364 (Timothy G. Pollock & Michael L. 
Barnett eds., 2012). 
3. See Thomas Noe, A Survey of the Economic Theory of Reputation: Its Logic and Limits, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 114 (Timothy G. Pollock & Michael L. Barnett 
eds., 2012).  
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company/businessman will suffer reputational damages. But everyday 
experience and systematic empirical evidence demonstrate that not all 
bad news is created equal.4 Some companies and businessmen emerge 
from failures unscathed while others go bankrupt. What explains the 
variation? Why does the market react negatively to some bad news but 
not to others? 
A large part of the answer, this Article argues, is dictated by the legal 
system. When news breaks about some adverse action by a company, the 
company’s stakeholders update their beliefs about the company and 
assess whether they want to continue doing business with it. But the 
process of belief-updating—the process of reputational sanctioning—
does not operate in a vacuum. The same bad news that ignites an initial 
market reaction may also get the legal system involved—through 
litigation or regulatory investigations. Then, in the process of 
determining whether to impose legal sanctions, the legal system 
produces as a byproduct information on the behavior of the parties to the 
dispute: what top managers knew about the problem, when they knew it, 
whether they could have stopped it, and so forth. This information is 
available to outside observers and affects the way that these third parties 
treat the parties to the dispute. In other words, the legal system provides 
better information to the public on which to base reputational judgments. 
Contrary to the common assumption,5 law and reputation are not 
independent of each other, but rather complement each other. The legal 
system’s reaction to misbehavior affects the market reaction. 
Recognizing the reputation-shaping role of the law carries important 
policy implications. Most basically, this Article calls for a more cautious 
approach to advocating for nonintervention. According to the 
conventional approach, when we recognize an area with strong 
reputational forces, we can scale back on legal intervention.6 For 
                                                     
4. See infra Part I.  
5. For an overview of the conventional approach, see Peter-Jan Engelen, Legal Versus 
Reputational Penalties in Deterring Corporate Misconduct, in DOES ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
MATTER? GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS AND OUTCOMES 71–95 (Mehmet Ugur & David Sunderland 
eds., 2011). For notable exceptions, see Eric Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 
1982–83 (2001) (strong market norms facilitate better legal control); Scott Baker & Albert H. Choi, 
Embedding Costly Litigation into Repeat Interactions 18 (Va. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 2013-
02, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2195749 [https://perma.cc/7D6V-68SH] (firms can choose to 
subject themselves to formal sanctions, thus facilitating better informal sanctions); Edward M. 
Iacobucci, On the Interaction Between Legal and Reputational Sanctions, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 
(2014) (legal sanctions affect reputational sanctions). 
6. See Engelen, supra note 5, at 71–72, 85; David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial 
Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 390 n.57 (1990); Yoshinobu Zasu, Sanctions by Social 
Norms and the Law: Substitutes or Complements?, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 381–82 (2007). 
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example, Polinsky and Shavell propose abolishing product liability for 
widely sold products.7 Their logic is that if non-legal forces are strong 
enough to carry most of the burden of deterrence, then it is not cost-
effective to keep a costly adjudication system simply for the sake of an 
incremental contribution to deterrence.8 At the heart of such an argument 
lies an implicit assumption that the legal system and the non-legal 
system are independent of each other. Polinsky and Shavell assume that 
we can remove the law—remove the background threat of litigation—
and the market forces will continue to function just the same. But in 
reality the strength of market forces is a function of the existing legal 
system. If we remove the background threat of litigation, perhaps the 
costs of reputational sanctions will rise. 
A few words on methodology and scope are in order from the outset. 
Scholars have largely neglected the question of how reputation matters 
not because they find reputational incentives to be unimportant, but 
rather because scholars find them to be messy.9 Reputational forces 
follow fuzzy dynamics and are hard to capture in neat models. My 
strategy in fleshing out the important yet understudied reputational 
forces is therefore to triangulate.10 That is, I examine reputation from 
multiple theoretical and empirical angles: synthesizing insights from 
various literatures (information economics, social psychology, and 
communication science); examining the fit of my theory with existing 
statistical data and case studies to delineate the theory’s strengths and 
limitations; and gathering insights from interviewing key practitioners 
who work on the intersection between the court of law and the court of 
public opinion (crisis management consultants, litigators, and business 
journalists).11 For considerations of brevity and scope I do not cover 
here all the vast topic of interactions between legal and non-legal 
systems. I focus here mostly on reputational sanctions rather than moral 
                                                     
7. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1438. I am extrapolating freely from Polinsky and 
Shavell’s paper for the sake of the argument. I do not treat all of their arguments against product 
liability, but rather focus only on their points about deterrence. 
8. Id. 
9. Cf. Arvind Parkhe, “Messy” Research, Methodological Predispositions, and Theory 
Development in International Joint Ventures, 18 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 227, 247 (1993) (noting that 
important yet fuzzy factors are being left out of analysis). 
10. The idea behind triangulation is that combining multiple theoretical and empirical materials 
can minimize the biases of any single theory/method. Triangulation is especially fitting when 
dealing with messy factors with little existing hard data, as in this case. It bolsters the prima facie 
plausibility of the theory-building stage. See Paulette M. Rothbauer, Triangulation, in THE SAGE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS 893 (Lisa M. Given ed., 2008). 
11. See infra Appendix: List of Interviews, detailing the methodology and listing the most 
consequential interviews.  
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sanctions;12 and on corporate reputation rather than individual 
reputation.13 
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I explains how reputational 
sanctions work and why they are inherently noisy. Consider the different 
components involved in the process of reputational sanctioning. First, 
those who dispense reputational sanctions (the company stakeholders) 
do not have enough information to judge correctly what happened and 
how it happened. Even when stakeholders do have information, they 
often process it imperfectly due to well-documented behavioral biases 
such as focusing too much on available and salient issues. Second, the 
intermediaries who disseminate information on corporate behavior, such 
as mass media or corporate watchdogs, have incentives to cater to their 
audiences’ biases. They tend to exaggerate certain criticisms and 
downplay others, as a function of what sells newspapers or attracts 
donors and volunteers.14 Finally, those who are sanctioned—the 
companies themselves—invest heavily in distorting the information 
environment with tactics such as smokescreens and scapegoating. As a 
result of all these inherent flaws, the market tends to over-react to certain 
misbehaviors and under-react to others. Indeed, there exist plenty 
examples of stakeholders that stop doing business with perfectly fine 
companies or continuing doing business with rotten companies. The 
market, when left alone, has trouble calibrating reputational sanctions 
correctly. 
But in reality the market is rarely left alone. This is where Part II 
comes in, fleshing out the different ways in which the law affects 
reputational sanctions. The Part focuses especially on the previously 
                                                     
12. To clarify the terminology: adverse actions may trigger various non-legal sanctions. When the 
violator suffers from diminished business opportunities in the future, the sanction is reputational. 
When the violator suffers shaming—the opprobrium of others—the sanction is an external moral 
sanction. When the violator suffers from her own guilty feelings, the sanction is an internal moral 
sanction. For more on the typology of non-legal systems of control, see Robert C. Clark, Laws, 
Markets, and Morals (Jan. 2010) (unpublished manuscript).  
13. The reason for such a focus is pragmatic: I believe that in the context of big businesses the 
supply and demand of credible reputation information is the most burning issue, due to severe 
asymmetric information problems. The focus on corporate behavior also distinguishes my work 
from some of the previous analyses of law and social norms. I do not focus on close-knit 
communities with repeated interactions, but rather on contexts where reputation information travels 
via intermediaries, relying on technology to reach larger, loose-knit communities. Cf. Lisa 
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond 
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 116 (1992). Accordingly, I do not deal with the traditional 
problems of reputation information, such as local distribution and impermanence, but rather with 
understudied problems, such as how to make sense of an abundance of ambiguous information, or 
which intermediary to trust. See infra Part V.  
14. See infra Part I.  
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overlooked “second-opinion effects.” When company stakeholders read 
bad news about the company, they face a decision: whether to continue 
interacting with the company or not. Litigation and regulatory 
investigations generate another third-party assessment on the behavior of 
primary wrongdoers, which stakeholders can then use to rethink their 
initial decision. The legal system’s second opinion can be valuable 
because it produces new facts and more nuanced interpretations of the 
misbehavior in question. Take the classic example of internal e-mail 
communications exposed during the discovery stage, showing what and 
when top managers knew about the misconduct. Litigation and 
investigations can also shape stakeholders’ beliefs without producing 
new information, simply by increasing the saliency and reducing the 
uncertainty about existing information. For instance, legal disputes with 
large, visible companies often generate ready-made quotes and 
documents that increase the scope and change the tone of media 
coverage. 
Although overall the existence of a well-functioning legal system 
facilitates better reputation systems, there exist specific contexts where 
the law generates zero or even negative impact on reputational 
evaluations. Part III, therefore, proceeds to provide a blueprint to apply 
the general second-opinion theory to specific legal fields, and delineates 
the conditions that determine whether legal disputes increase or decrease 
the reputational sanction attached to misbehavior. This Part emphasizes 
the forces that distort the information flow from the courtroom to the 
court of public opinion. It analyzes why judicial scorning can actually 
help the defendant company’s reputation, when companies manage to 
hijack the information flow by producing smokescreens, and how 
information intermediaries selectively pick what pieces of information to 
highlight and what to ignore. 
Part IV sketches policy implications. We have already mentioned one 
basic implication, namely, that strong non-legal forces do not necessarily 
eliminate the need for legal intervention. More specifically, to the extent 
that litigation produces an informational public good (that is, accurate 
information on the behavior of prominent companies) court practices 
should be tailored to assure the flow of credible information. Part IV 
therefore reevaluates key legal institutions based on their contribution to 
information production. In the process the Article refocuses timely and 
practical debates, such as the desirability of the heightened pleading 
standards recently adopted in Twombly15 and Iqbal.16 
                                                     
15. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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Part V synthesizes the Article’s original contributions by juxtaposing 
them with the extant related literature. For example, this Part revisits and 
amends existing applications of reputation theory to international law 
and product liability. I then conclude with a few caveats and directions 
for further extending the Article’s arguments. 
I. REPUTATIONAL SANCTIONS: HOW THEY WORK; WHY 
THEY ARE NOISY 
To understand how the law affects reputation, we first need to 
understand how reputation works. The legal literature has said 
surprisingly little about the process by which bad deeds translate into 
reputational sanctions. The conventional approach treats reputational 
sanctioning as a straightforward, binary process: as long as market 
players learn about misbehavior, they will punish the misbehaving 
entities by withholding future business opportunities.17 Under this 
simplistic approach, legal scholars assume that reputational concerns 
shape behavior in a certain scenario, without fully explaining why this is 
so or examining the social costs of reputational sanctions. This Part 
shifts our approach from making assumptions on whether reputation 
matters to explaining how exactly reputation matters. By drawing on 
recent theoretical and empirical insights from the multidisciplinary 
reputation literature,18 I show that in reality reputational sanctioning is 
an inherently noisy process, with the potential to exact heavy social 
costs. Even when market players learn about certain misbehavior, they 
often lack the incentives and/or information to properly update their 
beliefs about the misbehaving company. As a result, the market 
systematically under-reacts to certain types of misconduct and over-
reacts to others. 
A. How Reputational Sanctions Work 
A company’s reputation can be defined as the set of beliefs that 
stakeholders hold regarding the company’s quality.19 Without the ability 
                                                     
16. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
17. See Talley, supra note 5, at 1960 n.15 (collecting references for the common approach). 
18. For an overview of the recent surge in reputation scholarship, see Charles J. Fombrun, The 
Building Blocks of Corporate Reputation: Definitions, Antecedents, Consequences, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 94–96 (Timothy G. Pollock & Michael L. Barnett eds., 
2012). 
19. See Cynthia E. Devers et al., A General Theory of Organizational Stigma, 20 ORG. SCI. 154, 
156 (2009). 
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to directly observe the company’s abilities and intentions, stakeholders 
rely on the company’s past observable actions as cues to evaluate how 
the company is likely to behave in the future.20 In that sense, a 
reputational sanction is the product of stakeholders updating beliefs and 
lowering expectations. Upon hearing bad news about the company, 
stakeholders infer that the company’s “type” is worse than they have 
realized. The company is now perceived as more likely to defect in the 
future, and so stakeholders reduce their willingness to interact with the 
company going forward. Investors hearing about a corporate governance 
scandal will start demanding higher returns for their investment, 
customers hearing about a product recall will purchase fewer products, 
and so forth. The aggregate of diminished business opportunities 
constitutes the reputational sanction for violating market norms. 
So far, the story seems straightforward: if a company misbehaves, it 
risks losing future business opportunities. But a much more interesting 
question remains understudied: how exactly do stakeholders update their 
beliefs? How many business opportunities will the company lose for a 
given misconduct? After all, we know from everyday experience that not 
all bad news is created equal. Similar adverse actions cause different 
reputational outcomes. One financial company weathers fraud 
allegations relatively unscathed while another goes bankrupt. One top 
executive takes the fall when her company misbehaves while another is 
unaffected. So what explains the variation in market reaction? 
The fast-emerging reputation literature has recognized several 
determinants of reputational sanctions.21 For our purposes, it suffices to 
focus on the general criterion: indicativeness of future behavior.22 
Reputation sanctioning rests on the “how is it relevant to me” question. 
That is, stakeholders finding out about a corporate misconduct try to 
infer how this specific event is indicative of their own future interactions 
with the company. Some pieces of bad news are deemed more relevant 
                                                     
20. A company’s reputation can be thought of as the cash value of the trust that different 
stakeholders put in the company. See Karpoff, supra note 2, at 363. I refrain from using the notion 
of trust here, in order to avoid the common confusion between Bayesian belief-updating models and 
repeated-interaction models of reputation. See Luís M. B. Cabral, The Economics of Trust and 
Reputation: A Primer 3 (June 2005) (unpublished manuscript) http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~lcabral/ 
reputation/Reputation_June05.pdf [https://perma.cc/N32V-HGWY]. 
21. See, e.g., Yuri Mishina et al., The Path Dependence of Organizational Reputation: How 
Social Judgment Influences Assessments of Capability and Character, 33 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 459, 
461 (2012). 
22. See Noe, supra note 3, at 117. 
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than others.23 For example, when stakeholders believe that the bad 
outcome resulted from an isolated temporary mistake (such as a rogue 
low-level employee who was subsequently fired), the reputational 
sanction will be relatively low. By contrast, when stakeholders believe 
that the bad outcome resulted from a deep-seated organizational flaw 
(such as a total breakdown of checks and balances throughout the 
company hierarchy), the reputational sanction will be relatively high. 
After all, no one wants to work for, buy from, or invest in companies 
with deep-rooted problems that will likely resurface. 
This intuitive point is worth emphasizing, as it has largely escaped the 
legal literature. The revelation of bad news about a company does not 
automatically translate into reputational sanctions. Public revelation of 
misconduct is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. For one, certain 
types of bad news carry zero reputational repercussions. Indeed, Karpoff 
and co-authors showed that when companies get caught polluting the 
environment or bribing officials in developing countries (misbehavior 
against unspecified third parties), there is little to no reputational harm.24 
More importantly, even for misbehaviors that do carry reputational 
repercussions (misbehavior against trade partners, as in breaching 
contracts), the magnitude of the sanction varies greatly as a function of 
the public perception of what caused the debacle. Generally speaking, 
when stakeholders read bad news, they try to infer the degree of 
intentionality and controllability involved in the misconduct.25 The more 
stakeholders perceive the reported misbehavior as intentional and 
controllable, the more they will update downward their evaluation of the 
company—a bigger reputational sanction. 
To illustrate, consider an empirical study of stock market reactions to 
airplane crashes.26 The study finds that not all news of crashes is created 
equal. Crashes have a negative effect on stock prices only when the air 
carrier is reported to be at fault.27 When the Wall Street Journal 
attributes the crash to internal causes, such as maintenance problems, the 
                                                     
23. After all, reputational sanctions rest on self-interest, unlike other types of non-legal sanctions. 
Those who engage in social shaming or guilty feelings make a conscious decision to incur costs for 
the sake of sanctioning.  
24. See Karpoff, supra note 2, at 372.  
25. See Rebecca Reuber & Eileen Fischer, Organizations Behaving Badly: When Are 
Discreditable Actions Likely to Damage Organizational Reputation?, 93 J. BUS. ETHICS 39, 42–43 
(2010); Batia M. Wiesenfeld et al., The Stigmatization and Devaluation of Elites Associated with 
Corporate Failures: A Process Model, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 231, 235 (2008).  
26. See Mark L. Mitchell & Michael T. Maloney, Crisis in the Cockpit? The Role of Market 
Forces in Promoting Air Travel Safety, 32 J.L. & ECON. 329 (1989). 
27. Id. at 354. 
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stock prices decline dramatically.28 By contrast, when the Journal 
reports that the crash was caused by external conditions, such as 
unanticipated weather conditions or a mistake by the ground crew at the 
airport, the market does not react negatively.29 
The upshot is that the process of translating bad news into 
reputational assessments requires not just facts about what happened but 
also interpretations and judgments of how things happened.30 And the 
next crucial step is to acknowledge that the facts are often open to 
multiple interpretations and market players often get the interpretation 
wrong. Unlike in the airplane crashes scenario, where it is relatively easy 
to attribute the right cause to the problem, in other contexts stakeholders 
often interpret an isolated mistake as a deep-seated flaw and vice versa. 
There is often a gap between outsiders’ perceptions and the reality of 
how things happened. To better understand reputational sanctions, we 
therefore need to delve into the sources that bridge gaps between 
perception and reality. 
B. Why Reputational Sanctions Are Noisy31 
Legal scholars tend to assume that reputational sanctioning is a 
frictionless, uncomplicated process in which individuals somehow get 
access to information about corporate misconduct, rationally process this 
information, and reevaluate companies’ abilities and characters. The 
aggregate of atomistic individual re-evaluations supposedly forms the 
reputational sanction.32 In reality, these assumptions rarely hold. For 
                                                     
28. Id. at 353–54.  
29. Id. 
30. See Daniel B. Klein, Knowledge, Reputation, and Trust, by Voluntary Means, in 
REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT 1, 4 (Daniel B. Klein 
ed., 1997). 
31. “Noise” is a well-developed concept in information economics. See, e.g., URS BIRCHLER & 
MONICA BÜTLER, INFORMATION ECONOMICS 20–22 (2007). It has also been applied to reputation in 
various contexts. See, e.g., Sarah C. Rice, Reputation and Uncertainty in Online Markets: An 
Experimental Study, 23 INFO. SYS. RES. 436, 442 (2012). For our purposes, saying that reputational 
sanctions are noisy basically means that they are inaccurate. A company can lose many business 
opportunities for a minor misbehavior, while losing very few business opportunities for a bigger 
misbehavior.   
32. For references to and critique of the conventional approach see Christopher McKenna & 
Rowena Olegario, Corporate Reputation and Regulation in Historical Perspective, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 260, 272 (Timothy G. Pollock & Michael L. Barnett eds., 
2012); Juan Jose Ganuza et al., Product Liability Versus Reputation (Feb. 3, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://www.webmeets.com/files/papers/earie/2013/371/EARIE%202013%20FGP 
%20JJG.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZ7B-EHC7]. For notable exceptions see David Charny, Illusions of 
a Spontaneous Order: “Norms” in Contractual Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1857 
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one, information does not simply fall in our path. Individuals get 
information from intermediaries who selectively screen what 
information to convey and add their own (distorted) take. The process of 
reputational sanctioning is systematically distorted due to issues with 
asymmetric information, judgment biases, and divergent incentives. This 
section elaborates by breaking the process of reputational sanctioning 
into its different components. 
1. Players Who Dispense Sanctions (Stakeholders) 
Unlike legal sanctions, reputational sanctions are not dispensed by 
public officials, but rather by the company stakeholders themselves. The 
stakeholders who reduce their interactions with misbehaving companies 
have the right incentives: they stand to gain from accurately judging how 
things happened and from staying away from bad companies. However, 
stakeholders often lack the right information. It is especially hard for 
outsiders to know the inner workings of the company. And so even when 
outsiders know with some certainty what happened—that a company 
granted a big bonus for a failed CEO, or that a certain amount of people 
were harmed by an auto tire defect—they find it hard to understand how 
things happened. In other words, stakeholders are not well informed 
about questions such as what top managers knew, when they knew it, 
and could they have stopped it.33 
Furthermore, even when stakeholders have information, they process 
it imperfectly.34 Judgment biases sway our reputational assessments.35 
For example, we tend to overly focus on issues that can be easily 
summoned into our memory (availability bias), and attribute bad 
outcomes to internal rather than external causes (fundamental attribution 
error).36 
                                                     
(1996); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1477, 1505 (1996); Kyle D. Logue, Coordinating Sanctions in Tort, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2313, 2356–57 (2010) (informal sanctions may suffer from high information costs); David A. Skeel, 
Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1825 (2001).  
33. Stakeholders are thus asymmetrically informed about “second-level information”: we observe 
the bad outcomes but are unaware of the circumstances that led to them. See MICHAEL REGESTER & 
JUDY LARKIN, RISK ISSUES AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT 187 (2005); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 396 
(1985).  
34. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 70 (2007). 
35. See Mishina et al., supra note 21, at 459. 
36. See, e.g., Donald Lange et al., Organizational Reputation: A Review, 37 J. MGMT. 153, 173 
(2011); Andrea M. Sjovall & Andrew C. Talk, From Actions to Impressions: Cognitive Attribution 
Theory and the Formation of Corporate Reputation, 7 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 269, 274–75 
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2. Players Who Facilitate Sanctions (Information Intermediaries) 
Another basic and overlooked problem with reputational sanctions 
stems from the narrow incentives of those who provide information and 
interpretations on corporate misbehavior.37 We form impressions of 
companies based not just on direct experience, but also on what we 
gather from mass media, as well as other intermediaries such as stock 
analysts, institutional investors, and corporate watchdogs.38 Reputational 
sanctions in mass markets are therefore largely determined by how 
intermediaries interpret and diffuse information. These intermediaries 
often possess more information and expertise than the average 
stakeholder. However, intermediaries have their own narrow incentives 
to push the market toward overreacting to some behaviors and 
underreacting to others.39 As a corporate watchdog, it pays to publish 
exaggerated criticisms against the McDonald’s-es of the world. After all, 
eliciting a strong market reaction against visible companies will help you 
win the competition for donors’ money and volunteers’ time. And as a 
profit-minded newspaper owner, it pays to avoid investing in the risky 
venture of investigating opaque corporate shenanigans, focusing instead 
on rebroadcasting publicly available information.40 
                                                     
(2004). See generally RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS 22–23 (2015).  
37. The broader point here is that there is no systematic relationship between the private and 
social benefits of reputational sanctions. See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between 
the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997) (same 
regarding legal system). Accurate reputational sanctions carry social benefits: warning market 
players of a specific wrongdoer, deterring future potential wrongdoers, and causing market players 
to switch to doing business with the worthier competitors of the wrongdoer. See Robert Cooter & 
Ariel Porat, Should Courts Deduct Non-Legal Sanctions from Damages?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 
405–06 (2001). Reputational sanctions also come with social costs, such as resources spent on 
certifying rumors or fighting back false allegations. Those who engage in reputational sanctioning––
rumor propagators, media channels, stakeholders––do not fully internalize the social costs and 
benefits. And so even when market players enjoy access to information and process it correctly, 
they may still engage in too little or too much reputational sanctioning. 
38. See PETER FIRESTEIN, CRISIS OF CHARACTER: BUILDING CORPORATE REPUTATION IN THE 
AGE OF SKEPTICISM 241 (2009); Stefano DellaVigna & Matthew Gentzkow, Persuasion: Empirical 
Evidence, ANN. REV. ECON. 643, 644 (2010). 
39. See DellaVigna & Gentzkow, supra note 38, at 659–60; Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, 
The Bubble and the Media, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN A GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 83, 90–95 (Peter K. Cornelius & Bruce Kogut eds., 2003).  
40. See Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, The Corporate Governance Role of the Media, in THE 
RIGHT TO TELL: THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 119–20 (World Bank 
Inst. ed., 2002); Damian Tambini, What Are Financial Journalists For?, 11 JOURNALISM STUD. 
158, 162 (2010). A growing literature documents the flaws in media reporting, such as dependence 
on corporate insiders for information and advertising revenues. See, e.g., Jonathan Reuter & Eric 
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Indeed, one study found that the financial media criticizes executive 
stock-option plans based on high value at the exercising date (which is a 
function of external conditions) rather than at the granting date (which is 
more related to the strength of corporate governance).41 Another study 
found that the media criticizes shady accounting practices based on the 
visibility of companies rather than the size of the discrepancy: large, 
well-known companies get more negative coverage for more minor 
deviations.42 Such studies corroborate our notion that the media targets 
companies based not on the social harm done, but rather on visibility of 
and resentment toward these companies. More generally, even if 
intermediaries can produce accurate information (that is, they manage to 
overcome their own limited attention span or expertise), they often do 
not want to (because they prefer catering to their constituents’ biases).43 
3. Players Who Are Sanctioned (Misbehaving Companies) 
To debunk yet another simplifying assumption: reputational sanctions 
are not a one-sided event. Companies do not go down without a fight. 
Much like legal control, reputational control is a function of ongoing 
interactions between regulators and regulated players.44 Corporate 
insiders invest billions in an attempt to hijack the information flow and 
influence how their adverse actions are being interpreted by the 
market.45 
Companies often push the market to underreact to problems by hiding 
their misconduct (preventing/delaying reputational sanctions). Consider 
for example the documented pattern of camouflaging executive pay.46 
                                                     
Zitzewitz, Do Ads Influence Editors? Advertising and Bias in the Financial Media, 121 Q.J. ECON. 
197, 225 (2006) (finding evidence for biased reporting in favor of advertisers). 
41. See John E. Core et al., The Power of the Pen and Executive Compensation, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 
1, 17 (2007). 
42. See Gregory S. Miller, The Press as a Watchdog for Accounting Fraud, 44 J. ACCT. RES. 
1001, 1004 (2006). 
43. See Brian J. Bushee et al., The Role of the Business Press as an Information Intermediary, 48 
J. ACCT. RES. 1, 11 (2010); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk 
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 714, 750 (1999); Wiesenfeld et al., supra note 25, at 235. 
44. The “New Governance” scholars emphasized this point for legal systems of control. See 
Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, 
Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1174 (2010). It is 
time we flesh it out for reputation systems of control as well.  
45. Cf. Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational 
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 264–72 
(2003). 
46. See LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 64–70 (2004). 
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Corporate managers anticipate that if news breaks about their inflated 
pay, it will cause an outrage among stakeholders.47 In anticipation of the 
outrage, corporate insiders often manipulate outsiders’ perceptions by 
changing how the pay package looks.48 By choosing to give the CEO an 
extra undeserved ten million dollars through complex and opaque stock 
option plans, insiders may prevent an outrage that would have occurred 
if the CEO had received a less costly but more visible five million 
dollars in cash.49 
Another distortion comes from companies’ attempts to affect the 
market interpretation of revealed misconduct. Consider for example 
companies’ investment in corporate social responsibility (CSR) as an 
image buffer. Stakeholders are less likely to attribute bad intentions to a 
perceivably nice company, chalking up the bad news to a one-off 
mistake rather than a deep-seated flaw.50 When the nice-guy buffer 
works effectively, the company mitigates the risk of reputational 
sanctions. Enron serves as a case in point: one of the least-covered 
aspects of the heavily covered debacle is that Enron was considered the 
poster child for CSR before its collapse.51 Some scholars and activists 
believe that the accolades showered upon Enron for its CSR image 
contributed to the slow detection and punishment of Enron’s 
misbehavior.52 
C. The Implications of Noisy Reputation: Market Under- and Over-
Deterrence 
Taken together, the emerging pieces of evidence suggest that 
reputational sanctions are much noisier than was previously assumed. 
The next necessary step is to examine why it matters that reputation is 
noisy: what are the social costs stemming from noisy reputational 
assessments? At the most basic level, the evidence demonstrates that 
flaws in reputational sanctions are not limited to instances where the 
market does not detect corporate misbehavior. Market players can 
                                                     
47. Id.  
48. Id. 
49. Id.  
50. See Jay J. Janney & Steve Gove, Reputation and Corporate Social Responsibility 
Aberrations, Trends, and Hypocrisy: Reactions to Firm Choices in the Stock Options Backdating 
Scandal, 48 J. MGMT. STUD. 1562 (2011); Daryl Koehn & Joe Ueng, Is Philanthropy Being Used by 
Corporate Wrongdoers to Buy Good Will?, 14 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 1 (2010). 
51. See Roy Shapira, Corporate Philanthropy as Signaling and Co-optation, 80 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1889, 1939 (2012). 
52. Id. 
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become aware of a certain corporate behavior, yet interpret it 
inaccurately. Stakeholders may stop doing business with perfectly fine 
companies, or they may ignore early warning signs and continue doing 
business with rotten companies. 
More importantly, as I will explain, the evidence suggests that the 
market systematically over-reacts to certain misbehaviors and under-
reacts to others. The noise in reputational sanctions should not be 
discarded as irrational mistakes that cancel each other out. Companies 
that care about their reputation face incentives to excessively avoid some 
worthy behaviors (reputational over-deterrence), and excessively engage 
in some bad behaviors (reputational under-deterrence). As a result, 
reputational forces may distort primary behavior and hurt allocative 
efficiency. Companies may pick projects based on their reputational 
value and not on their “real” value. 
Polinsky and Shavell’s proposal to abolish product liability for widely 
sold products provides a good case for illustration.53 In making the 
argument that the market already monitors and deters misbehavior 
(whereby we can eliminate litigation without losing much deterrence), 
Polinsky and Shavell use three motivating examples: Johnson & 
Johnson’s cyanide-laced Tylenol, Audi’s self-accelerating cars, and 
Odwalla’s contaminated juice.54 In all these famous crises, information 
indeed disseminated quickly when something bad happened to widely 
sold products.55 When people died because they took a Tylenol, drove an 
Audi, or drank an Odwalla apple juice, the media were all over the story, 
consumers stopped purchasing products, and the stock prices 
plummeted.56 But a closer look at these three examples reveals an 
important yet overlooked point: we cannot assume that reputational 
forces punished and deterred optimally. In fact, in all these cases the 
market badly misjudged what happened and how it happened. 
The Tylenol poisonings and Audi’s self-accelerating cars are good 
examples of market over-reaction. In the Tylenol case, Johnson & 
Johnson initially suffered huge reputational damages for something that 
it did not do—it was a case of external product-tampering that happened 
                                                     
53. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1.  
54. Id. at 1443–44. The Tylenol crisis broke in 1982, when seven individuals died after taking a 
cyanide-laced drug. The Audi crisis broke in 1986, when Audi was accused of manufacturing a car 
that accelerated by itself. The Odwalla crisis broke in 1996, when several toddlers were harmed by 
drinking bacteria-infected juices.  
55. See id. (citing media coverage). 
56. Id. 
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on the retailer level.57 The madman who tampered with Johnson & 
Johnson products could have tampered with other companies’ products. 
Audi was also initially punished for something it did not do. As was 
later proven, the self-acceleration allegations were false.58 Audi’s cars 
did not accelerate by themselves; they accelerated because the accusers 
mistook the gas pedals for the brakes.59 Odwalla’s case is a perfect 
example of the flip-side: the market under-reacted to Odwalla’s 
breakdowns in quality control. Odwalla had a preexisting image of a do-
gooder, a socially responsible company, and that image served as a 
reputational buffer of sorts.60 And so, when top management stated that 
they could not have anticipated the juice contamination, stakeholders 
were willing to buy the company’s version and interpret the event 
favorably.61 
At their core, then, these three famous examples do not tell the tale of 
optimal reputational sanctioning. They rather tell the tale of distorted 
reputational sanctioning. We cannot assume that the market reaction to 
those crises incentivized companies to invest optimally in product safety. 
If anything, those market reactions only distorted incentives: companies 
will now invest too much in the safety of certain visible products 
(following Tylenol); invest less in safety in general because arbitrary 
allegations against you may erase your reputational capital (following 
Audi); or invest too much in erecting reputational buffers––focusing on 
image instead of real quality (following Odwalla). 
The lesson for legal scholars and policy makers is straightforward: 
recognizing an area of market behavior with strong reputational 
concerns only begins analysis. A full analysis requires identifying 
whether the reputational forces deter optimally or not. In particular, we 
should start paying attention to the previously overlooked problem of 
market over-deterrence. Existing analyses usually assume that the noise 
in reputational sanctions leads strictly to under-punishment: large 
companies enjoy mismatches of information and power versus market 
                                                     
57. See ERIC DEZENHALL & JOHN WEBER, DAMAGE CONTROL 15, 13–22 (2007).  
58. The details of the Audi case are based on PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK 
SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 57–74 (1991); Greg Farrell, Lurching into Reverse, 1 BRILL’S 
CONTENT 55 (1998). 
59. HUBER, supra note 58, at 57–74; Farrell, supra note 58, at 55. 
60. The details of the Odwalla case are based on Mallen Baker, Odwalla and the E-Coli 
Outbreak, MALLENBAKER.NET, http://www.mallenbaker.net/csr/crisis05.html [https://perma.cc/ 
RCC2-E5NJ] (last visited June 27, 2015); Jon Entine, The Odwalla Affair—Reassessing Corporate 
Social Responsibility, AT WORK (1999), http://www.jonentine.com/articles/odwalla.htm 
[https://perma.cc/QK6V-EL2Z]. 
61. Entine, supra note 60. 
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players, and so are likely to exploit the holes in reputation systems in 
their favor.62 But while it is indeed intuitive to think that companies can 
camouflage failures, one cannot ignore the dynamics that are in play 
once their failures are revealed. As scholars in other disciplines have 
recognized, once bad news breaks, market arbiters face incentives to pile 
on criticisms and stakeholders tend to overreact and unnecessarily sever 
ties with otherwise healthy companies.63 
An interesting question then becomes how to identify the 
circumstances that give rise to systematic under- or over-deterrence. 
While future empirical research is very much needed in this area, we can 
already glean some initial patterns from the extant literature. One 
important determinant of under-/over-reaction is the saliency of the 
company and issue at question. The market tends to over-react to failures 
of well-known companies and vivid failures, and under-react to less 
visible companies and opaque, complex issues.64 Another factor to 
consider is the type of harm done: the market is likely to under-react 
when the misbehavior causes multiple small harms or concealed harms, 
and over-react when the victims are easily identifiable.65 Yet another 
determinant is the state of the overall economy. Evidence suggests that 
                                                     
62. See, e.g., Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations 
Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1429–34 (2002). 
63. See ERIC DEZENHALL, NAIL ‘EM! CONFRONTING HIGH-PROFILE ATTACKS ON CELEBRITIES & 
BUSINESSES 107 (1999); DEZENHALL & WEBER, supra note 57, at 39; Dyck & Zingales, supra note 
40; R. William Ide & Douglas H. Yarn, Public Independent Fact-Finding: A Trust-Generating 
Institution for an Age of Corporate Illegitimacy and Public Mistrust, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1113, 1115, 
1139–40 (2003); Wiesenfeld et al., supra note 25, at 240–42. 
Granted, sometimes giving the public villains is socially beneficial: there are plenty of corporate 
villains worthy of punishment out there. But, overall, catering to biases generates incentives to 
punish villains more than they deserve, to make villains out of honestly incompetent businessmen, 
or to under-punish villains who fly under the radar. To further clarify: I do not claim that the market 
necessarily under- or over-deters. There will be times when the market punishes in the right 
measure. My point is not that the invisible hand of the market for reputation never works, but rather 
that it cannot be assumed to generate optimal deterrence consistently. 
64. See DEZENHALL, supra note 63 at 55, 86–88; DEZENHALL & WEBER, supra note 57, at 200–
01 (detailed examples of how corporate watchdogs selectively bark at visible companies); Pauline 
M. Ippolito, Bonding and Nonbonding Signals of Product Quality, 63 J. BUS. 41, 55 (1990) 
(availability bias causes stakeholders to excessively update upward their beliefs about a product 
defect after they read front-page news about a case of one product defect); Reuber & Fischer, supra 
note 25, at 47. To recast the example of criticizing executive pay arrangements: media and activists 
focus their criticism on the issue of overall level of pay, while in reality the structure of pay (how 
managerial incentives are tied to long-term performance) is more relevant to the company’s 
stakeholders. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 46, at 121. 
65. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1444–45. 
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reputational sanctions follow a supra-cyclical pattern.66 When the 
economy is down, the public is actively searching for villains, so news 
about corporate misconduct may attract more attention. As a result, the 
market may over-react. By contrast, when the economy is booming, 
stakeholders might be more likely to ignore early warning signs. 
Whether the market is under- or over-reacting, the basic point about 
markets for reputation stands: they are much more flawed than was 
previously acknowledged. Accurate reputation information is in a sense 
a public good.67 And private players, when left alone, lack the 
information and incentives to produce accurate reputational sanctions. 
How can reputation markets function, then? Part of the answer lies in the 
fact that in reality the market is rarely left alone. Adverse actions are 
interpreted and assessed not just by market arbiters, but also by legal 
arbiters. In the Tylenol, Audi, Odwalla, and many other famous cases, 
the legal system produced information that propelled market players to 
revise their initial reaction to the bad news. In order to get a full picture 
of reputation we therefore need to explore the different channels through 
which the law generates information and affects reputations. 
II. HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM AFFECTS REPUTATIONAL 
SANCTIONS 
It is intuitive that decisions and events in the court of law affect the 
court of public opinion, and vice versa. Yet up to this point legal 
scholars have tended to assume away complementarities between law 
and reputation, by treating the two systems as independent of each 
other.68 This Part challenges the conventional assumption by mapping 
the various channels through which the law can influence reputational 
evaluations. I divide the different influences into two categories, which 
will be termed “first-opinion” and “second-opinion” effects. The first 
deals with cases where market players are slow to react to corporate 
misconduct and the legal system propels them to react. The second 
category deals with cases where market players react almost 
immediately to corporate misconduct and the legal system later propels 
them to reevaluate their initial reaction. 
                                                     
66. Cf. Dyck & Zingales, supra note 40; Gregory Mark, The Legal History of Corporate Scandal: 
Some Observations on the Ancestry and Significance of the Enron Era, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1073, 
1083 (2003); Wiesenfeld et al., supra note 25, at 239–40. 
67. Cf. David S. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social Foundations of 
Defamation Law, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 264, 293 (2010). 
68. See supra note 6.  
10 - Shapira.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/18/2016  12:48 PM 
1212 REPUTATION THROUGH LITIGATION [Vol. 91:1193 
 
A. First-Opinion Effects 
We saw that one basic problem of reputational control arises from the 
difficulties of detecting and reacting in real time to corporate 
misbehavior. Parties who are harmed by corporate misbehavior may find 
it too costly to communicate the violation to third parties. The legal 
system helps reputation systems in such instances by revealing and 
drawing attention to adverse actions that would have otherwise gone 
unnoticed.69 Take for example mandatory disclosure requirements, 
which incentivize corporate decision-makers to publicly reveal 
information about their own misconduct.70 Similarly, whistleblower laws 
incentivize employees to reveal information about their employers’ 
misconduct. Litigation serves a similar function, albeit more indirectly. 
Litigation generates monetary incentives for harmed parties (such as 
damages and lawyers’ fees) to expose the misbehavior in court. As a 
side benefit, once the story is discussed in the court of law the gossip can 
spread more readily and credibly to the court of public opinion, 
increasing the chances that information about the company’s breaches 
will reach its stakeholders.71 
In other words, the law can serve to reduce the detection costs of 
reputation control systems: the costs of revealing misconduct and 
communicating it to a critical mass of market players. In such instances 
the law sets a reputational sanction in motion, pushing market players to 
react to corporate misconduct. 
In many other situations, however, market players hardly need 
pushing. Research suggests that market players learn about misconduct 
by large public companies—and act upon it—long before a lawsuit is 
filed. One recent comprehensive study estimates that the filing of a 
lawsuit is responsible for breaking bad news in less than seven percent 
of financial misconduct cases.72 In the other ninety-three percent of the 
                                                     
69. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary 
Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 443 (2005); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, 
at 1454–55. 
70. Troy A. Paredes, Sec. & Exch. Comm’r, Statement at Open Meeting to Propose Amendments 
Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (May 20, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/2009/spch052009tap.htm [https://perma.cc/Q7UR-FREN]. 
71. Indeed, it is a common practice to search for past and pending legal disputes of potential 
business counterparties. G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial 
Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221, 271 n.223 (1991). 
72. See Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., Database Challenges in Financial Misconduct Research 43 
tbl.4 (May 30, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2112569 
[https://perma.cc/3KJU-WQE3] (indicating that the filing of a class action lawsuit contributed to the 
announcement of wrongdoing in only 73 out of 1099 cases). The filing of a lawsuit lags the date on 
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cases market players learn about misbehavior from whistleblowers, 
investigative reporters, financial reports, and the like, rather than from 
courtroom records.73 Still, even when the legal system’s reaction is 
lagged it may nevertheless affect the market, albeit in a different way, to 
which we turn next. 
B. Second-Opinion Effects 
1. The Basic Story 
Bad news about a company often ignites two reactions. First, the 
market system’s reaction: stakeholders reducing their willingness to do 
business with the company. Then, the legal system’s reaction: a 
plaintiffs’ lawyer files a lawsuit or a regulator initiates an investigation 
to examine whether the company broke some rules and needs to pay for 
it. Importantly for our purposes, the process of determining whether to 
impose legal sanctions produces information on how the company 
behaved. In particular, litigation and investigations tend to produce 
information on questions such as what top managers knew and when 
they knew it. In that sense, litigation or regulatory investigations often 
create another “third-party assessment” of the company’s behavior. And 
to the extent that such information is made publicly available, it allows 
market players to reevaluate their assessment of the company’s quality. 
In other words, the company’s stakeholders can use the legal system’s 
lagged version of what and how things happened as a second opinion on 
their reputation judgments. In the second-opinion analogy, stakeholders 
are the decision-makers, pondering how to update beliefs about a 
misbehaving company; market arbiters (media, watchdogs, analysts) are 
the first-opinion givers; and legal arbiters are the second-opinion givers. 
To be sure, the fact that another assessment is available does not 
mean that it will be used. Not all second opinions are effective. In our 
context, however, the legal system’s version often makes a valuable 
second opinion, because it complements the market’s initial reaction 
nicely. Based on what we have learned so far about reputational 
judgments, we can generalize that the market will have a reasonable 
sense of what happened, but will have problems understanding how it 
happened. When news of corporate misbehavior breaks, stakeholders 
quickly learn exactly what the product defect was or how hefty a 
                                                     
which the market first learned about misconduct by a median of 23 days and an average of 150 
days. Id. at 16. 
73. Id. at 43 tbl.4. 
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severance package was awarded to the soon-to-be-leaving CEO. But 
stakeholders have poor information and resort to biased heuristics when 
trying to interpret whether the event is indicative of future behavior. 
Perhaps the product defect was an unforeseeable isolated mistake; 
perhaps the hefty severance package was the only reasonable card that 
the board could play given the circumstances. Legal arbiters, by contrast, 
enjoy more fact-finding powers, expertise, and credibility than market 
arbiters did when they initially judged the event.74 
First and foremost, the legal system vests powers in judges, 
investigators, and private litigants to probe and demand relevant 
information from corporate insiders. These insiders, in turn, know that 
the information they are disclosing during legal proceedings has to be 
full and accurate. These facts-generating powers were primarily 
designed to increase the accuracy of legal adjudication.75 But they also 
generate as a byproduct information to which market arbiters were not 
privy when they made their initial assessment. Think for example about 
intra-company emails being revealed only during discovery, exposing 
exactly what top managers knew and when they knew it. The factual 
picture painted during the process of litigation is therefore often more 
accurate and nuanced than the one painted by mass media during the 
initial market reaction.76 
Aside from being provided with better facts through the discovery 
process, the public is also provided with better interpretations of the 
facts through the adjudication process. For example, in order to evaluate 
whether misconduct is indicative of future behavior or not, one needs to 
assess the intentionality of the act. Judges are arguably seasoned experts 
in evaluating intentions: in many scenarios the legal doctrine requires a 
judge to determine the animus associated with a behavior. The legal 
system’s opinion may thus replace not just half-truths with verified facts, 
but also bias-laden judgments with expert judgments. 
To illustrate, let us now delve into four concrete examples where the 
legal system’s second opinion corrected different types of initial market 
misjudgments. 
                                                     
74. Cf. David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 Geo. L.J. 723, 752–53 
(2009) (comparing the courts’ and the media’s strengths in policing misbehavior). 
75. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 436 (1994).  
76. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 37, at 420; Tamar Frankel, Court of Law and Court of Public 
Opinion: Symbiotic Regulation of the Corporate Management Duty of Care, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 
353, 356 (2007); Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort 
Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 700 (2007). 
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2. Motivating Examples 
The above-mentioned crisis of Audi’s self-accelerating cars illustrates 
several flaws in reputational sanctioning, such as misinformed 
stakeholders and allegation-driven media.77 The major reputational 
damage to Audi occurred after CBS’s 60 Minutes picked up the self-
acceleration allegations and aired a story with dramatic interviews and a 
(fabricated) visual illustration of a driverless car accelerating.78 At that 
point, Audi’s reputation among U.S. customers was close to zero.79 
Then, after the immediate market overreaction, the story was picked up 
by plaintiffs’ lawyers who filed lawsuits and government regulators who 
initiated investigations.80 During cross-examination a new crucial piece 
of information came to light: the featured interviewee from the 60 
Minutes piece admitted to telling the police officer on the scene that she 
mistook the gas pedal for the brakes.81 And a thorough investigation by 
the regulatory agency—the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration—concluded that the cars did not accelerate by 
themselves.82 Audi then used the information produced by the legal 
system to try and correct the noisy information produced by rumor 
propagators and the media.83 The company bought full-page ads in 
major newspapers and simply filled them with quotes from the 
regulatory report, claiming vindication.84 
Another earlier example—the Odwalla case—illustrates the flip side: 
how asymmetric information and judgment biases may lead stakeholders 
to under-react. After Odwalla initially succeeded in convincing the 
public that the failure was unforeseeable,85 some of the lawsuits against 
it reached the discovery stage. The plaintiffs’ lawyers then exposed 
internal company documents showing that Odwalla’s managers actually 
knew about the potential health hazards in advance and chose to ignore 
                                                     
77. The details of the Audi case are based on PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK 
SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 57–74 (1991); Greg Farrell, Lurching into Reverse, 1 BRILL’S 
CONTENT 55 (1998). 
78. HUBER, supra note 58, at 57; Farrell, supra note 58, at 53–55. 
79. See Farrell, supra note 58, at 53. 
80. HUBER, supra note 58, at 61–62. 
81. Id. at 66; Farrell, supra note 58, at 54. 
82. HUBER, supra note 58, at 66–69; Farrell, supra note 58, at 53–54. 
83. Farrell, supra note 58, at 54–55. 
84. Id. at 54. 
85. See Entine, supra note 60. 
10 - Shapira.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/18/2016  12:48 PM 
1216 REPUTATION THROUGH LITIGATION [Vol. 91:1193 
 
the warnings.86 Consequently, the market rethought the trustworthiness 
of Odwalla, and the company’s reputation took a big dip.87 
In both the Audi and Odwalla examples, the legal system generated 
new pieces of information that helped stakeholders de-bias their 
judgments. Another famous corporate debacle—the Disney-Ovitz 
divorce—illustrates how judicial opinions affect stakeholders’ beliefs 
even without producing new information.88 In the mid-1990s Disney 
hired Hollywood’s super-agent Michael Ovitz to serve as president.89 
“Ovitz failed to perform satisfactorily and was fired after a year, but not 
before collecting a $140-million termination package from Disney.”90 
The Ovitz affair drew media coverage that was voluminous in scope and 
unfavorable in tone. Market and social arbiters piled on criticisms, 
framing the events as a classic case of managerial greed and total 
disregard for market norms.91 Some even insinuated that all the hiring 
and firing was a scam meant simply to transfer money from 
shareholders’ pockets to Ovitz’s.92 
Following the initial market reaction, Disney’s shareholders sued the 
directors for breaching their fiduciary duties in supervising the hiring 
and firing of Ovitz.93 After a prolonged legal battle, the Delaware judge 
presiding over the case delivered a lengthy decision that exonerated the 
defendants.94 For our purposes, more important than the legal outcomes 
are the reputational outcomes of the opinion. In a separate paper I looked 
at the content of media coverage of the Disney-Ovitz debacle, and 
showed that the valence of media coverage had become more favorable 
toward Disney following the verdict.95 For example, after the judge 
released his version, the media started to emphasize contextual (and not 
just causal) explanations of the debacle.96 The media started talking 
                                                     
86. Bill Marler, Another Lesson Learned the Hard Way: Odwalla E. Coli Outbreak 1996, 
MARLER BLOG (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.marlerblog.com/legal-cases/another-lesson-learned-the-
hard-way-odwalla-e-coli-outbreak-1996/#.VeHwwnvItnw [https://perma.cc/6D4V-EDDB].  
87. See Entine, supra note 60.  
88. For a detailed account of the history of the debacle, see In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005).  
89. Id. at 703–10. 
90. Roy Shapira, A Reputational Theory of Corporate Law, 26 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 26 
(2015); see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253 (Del. 2000). 
91. See Shapira, supra note 90, at 27. 
92. Cf. A. M. Rosenthal, Opinion, Hardtack for the Journey, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1996, at A25.  
93. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 258–59. 
94. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 772, 776 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
95. See Shapira, supra note 90, at 30.  
96. Id. at 30–31. 
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about the debacle in terms that suggested a perfect storm, reminding the 
readers that Disney was rushed into luring Ovitz with a hefty severance 
package because its previous president died in a helicopter crash and its 
CEO suffered a heart condition.97 To emphasize: the facts of a helicopter 
crash and a heart condition were never disputed or hidden; they were just 
not emphasized by the media prior to the judicial opinion. Another key 
fact that was readily available yet seldom mentioned prior to the verdict 
was how the market reacted to Ovitz’s hiring in real time.98 As the judge 
spotlighted (and the media followed suit) the stock market actually 
reacted extremely well to the hiring decision.99 Overall, even though the 
judge strongly criticized Disney’s directors on several occasions,100 there 
is reason to believe that his opinion helped convince stakeholders that 
Disney’s problems were less deep-rooted and more easily fixable than 
they had previously thought. 
We find the same pattern in many other cases.101 Stakeholders’ initial 
reactions when reading about corporate misbehavior are plagued by 
attribution errors and hindsight bias. Once bad news breaks, stakeholders 
often over-react because they tend to downplay the context and attribute 
negative outcomes to deep-seated flaws. Judges can balance this 
tendency, because their version usually spotlights the external conditions 
surrounding the event in question. 
The fourth and final example illustrates how the legal system’s 
second opinion helps stakeholders de-bias the information coming from 
the misbehaving companies. As the debacles of Salomon Brothers and 
Arthur Andersen illustrate, the legal system can either lend credibility to 
or discard a company’s version of the events. In 1991, news about 
Salomon Brothers’ trading shenanigans ignited a media firestorm, which 
in turn resulted in mass sell-offs of the company’s shares.102 The 
company acted promptly to recover the reputational harm: Warren 
Buffet took charge and the company offered transparency and full 
cooperation with the investigation.103 Salomon’s recovery is widely 
                                                     
97. See Disney, 907 A.2d at 699, 702.  
98. Id. at 708. 
99. Id.  
100. Id. at 760. 
101. See Shapira, supra note 90, at 38–40. 
102. The details are based on CHARLES J. FOMBRUN, REPUTATION: REALIZING VALUE FROM THE 
CORPORATE IMAGE 362–85 (1996); Lynn Sharp Paine & Michael A. Santoro, Forging the New 
Salomon (Harv. Bus. Sch., Case Study No. 9-395-046, 2004) (on file with author). 
103. FOMBRUN, supra note 102, at 375–81; Paine & Santoro, supra note 102, at 4, 10–11.  
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considered a success story.104 But why exactly did the Salomon recovery 
succeed? After all, many companies follow the same recipe of changing 
the management and promising to be nice from now on, yet do not 
recover reputational damages. 
In this specific case, the recovery efforts received a boost of 
credibility from financial regulators. Following the initial outcry, the 
Justice Department, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and 
other government agencies started investigating Salomon.105 Several 
months later, the SEC announced that Salomon had agreed to pay a $290 
million fine to settle the case.106 More importantly, the SEC chairman 
included in his announcement an assessment of the company’s behavior 
that pretty much certified what the company was claiming.107 The SEC 
lent credibility to the company’s attempts to distance itself from the 
wrongdoing, believing that the “infractions were rooted in individual 
excess rather than in systemic abuse,” and that current management did 
right in responding to the misconduct and “purging the company of its 
rogue elements.”108 The stock market reacted very positively to the 
announcement.109 
By contrast, when Arthur Andersen followed the same recipe in an 
attempt to distance itself from the Enron debacle, the market was not 
convinced.110 I argue that this is partly because the legal system 
produced information that discredited the company’s version. Arthur 
Andersen claimed that the misbehavior was the work of a single partner, 
who was subsequently fired.111 But the prosecutors chose to cut a deal 
with the singled-out partner, and the trial produced information about 
how pervasive the problems were, and how the higher-ups in Andersen 
were aware of them in real time.112 
Taken together, all these examples illustrate how the “legal system 
thus can serve as a safety valve for reputation systems. In instances 
where market players greatly under- or over-reacted, the legal system 
later provides a more balanced perspective of how things happened, 
thereby allowing market players to go back and correct their initial 
                                                     
104. See FOMBRUN, supra note 102, at 375, 384–85; Paine & Santoro, supra note 102, at 19–20. 
105. FOMBRUN, supra note 102, at 371–72; Paine & Santoro, supra note 102, at 10. 
106. FOMBRUN, supra note 102, at 384; Paine & Santoro, supra note 102, at 19. 
107. See FOMBRUN, supra note 102, at 381; Paine & Santoro, supra note 102, at 20. 
108. FOMBRUN, supra note 102, at 381. 
109. See id.; Paine & Santoro, supra note 102, at 20. 
110. See Reuber & Fischer, supra note 25, at 42. 
111. Id. 
112. See id.; MACEY, supra note 1, at 141–42. 
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assessment.”113 Perhaps more importantly and beyond the impact of the 
legal system on specific under- or over-reactions after the fact, “the mere 
background threat of litigation affects all future reputational 
assessments” to begin with.114 The next section elaborates. 
3. Ex Ante Effects 
Studies across various contexts show that when first-opinion givers 
anticipate the possibility of an accurate second opinion, they invest more 
in the accuracy of their initial assessments.115 We have ample reason to 
believe that the analogy applies to our context of providing information 
on corporate failures. Both the accusers and the accused are disciplined 
by a credible threat of second opinions.116 
The mere background threat of litigation pushes the accused 
companies to refrain from lying when denying accusations. Indeed, 
crisis management experts explicitly advise their clients to be disciplined 
in how they fight accusations, bearing in mind the possibility that their 
denials will be exposed in discovery as lies.117 
The background threat of litigation also pushes information 
intermediaries to make their accusations more accurate. A journalist or a 
corporate watchdog probably anticipates the possibility that future 
litigation will surface nuanced information about the behavior it is 
currently criticizing. Assuming they care about their reputation as a 
journalist/activist, the possibility of being later exposed as wrong will 
                                                     
113. Shapira, supra note 90, at 13 (emphasis original).  
114. Id. 
115. In the literature on second opinions, such a reaction is termed the “sentinel effect.” Adrian 
Vermeule, Second Opinions and Institutional Design, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1435, 1464 (2011) (emphasis 
in original). For overviews of second-opinion effects in the legal literature, see Michael Klausner et 
al., Second Opinions in Litigation, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1411 (1998); Vermeule, supra. 
116. To be sure, the background threat of litigation will not completely align the incentives of 
intermediaries with the social interest in accurate reputational sanctioning. For example, even if the 
media anticipate that the legal system will shed light on what actually happened, they will still over-
report on salient issues while under-reporting on opaque issues.  
117. See REGESTER & LARKIN, supra note 33, at 194. The background threat of litigation thus 
facilitates the ex ante investment in reputation research. Searching for corporate misbehavior brings 
more predictable returns when searchers (watchdogs) know that companies cannot simply brush 
aside worthy attacks. However, in certain scenarios the threat of litigation is unlikely to discipline 
corporate denial/justification communications. Corporate insiders with a very high discount rate (a 
CEO nearing retirement, a company on the brink of insolvency) need all the recovery that they can 
get. So they may choose to lie and take the risk that their lie will be exposed down the road. Or, the 
information may be unverifiable: adjudicators will not be able to determine ex post whether the 
company lied. My point here is not an absolute but a relative one: the more credible the threat of 
future litigation/investigation is, the more disciplined companies will be in their recovery talk.  
10 - Shapira.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/18/2016  12:48 PM 
1220 REPUTATION THROUGH LITIGATION [Vol. 91:1193 
 
make them invest more in their initial assessments. It is as if the legal 
system helps us better assess not only the behavior of business 
corporations, but also the behavior of corporate watchdogs. Watchdogs 
that make unfounded accusations can later be exposed as unprofessional. 
By contrast, high-quality watchdogs can use legal success stories to 
boast of their effectiveness as compared to their competitors, namely, 
other watchdogs advancing the same cause.118 In that sense, the legal 
system facilitates a market for corporate watchdogs’ reputation.119 
Indeed, when I sampled websites of prominent corporate watchdogs, I 
found that almost every website contains a list of “legal victories” 
describing how watchdog-initiated fights led to hefty damages awards or 
changes in regulation.120 For example, the Natural Resources Defense 
Council (NRDC), an environmental non-governmental organization, 
declares itself “the most effective lobbying and litigating group on 
environmental issues.”121 What makes them so effective, you may ask? 
Well, for one thing, they tell you, they have an army of 500 savvy 
lawyers, scientists, and policy advocates.122 The website then refers the 
visitor to a long list of legal battles that the NRDC has won.123 To be 
sure, these anecdotal observations are not enough to prove that the legal 
                                                     
118. In that sense, courts serve as a clearinghouse for watchdogs. Over time litigation allows the 
public to form rough proxies about the quality of certain watchdogs. We observe that watchdog X is 
behind many legal fights that were found to be credible, while watchdog Y is behind too many 
frivolous fights. So we trust future assessments of watchdog X more than those of watchdog Y. For 
example, when Wendy’s was accused of selling a woman chili containing a severed human finger, 
the vivid accusation threatened to kill the Wendy’s brand. But Wendy’s reputation quickly 
recovered because journalists found out that the accuser had a record of frivolous lawsuits. The 
public’s attention then shifted from the alleged misbehavior of the company to the bad intentions of 
the accuser. See DEZENHALL & WEBER, supra note 57, at 127–30. 
119. See generally Ling Liu, Systematic Measurement of Centralized Online Reputation Systems 
14 (Apr. 2011) (published Ph.D. thesis, Durham University), http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/881/ 
[https://perma.cc/2DTL-XJAT]. Reputation information is a credence good: it is hard for consumers 
to ascertain whether the information that they are buying is accurate. When we purchase credence 
goods, we base our decisions on whether we trust the seller or not. So, aside from the market for 
for-profit reputation, there is a market for non-profit reputation: some watchdogs are considered 
more credible than others. The question then becomes: where can we get information on the abilities 
and intentions of watchdogs? I argue that the legal system helps to distinguish between high- and 
low-quality reputation arbiters.  
120. My sampling criterion was straightforward: all the watchdogs that Dezenhall’s crisis 
management book mentions as prominent.  
121. About Us, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/about/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2015) 
(quoting The Wall Street Journal). See also Litigation Project - Current Docket, CTR. FOR SCI. PUB. 
INTEREST, http://www.cspinet.org/litigation/current.html [https://perma.cc/S7U9-EG95] (providing 
an even more straightforward example). 
122. NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 121. 
123. Id. 
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system facilitates a better market for watchdog reputation, and more 
systematic evidence is needed.124 Nevertheless, the observations indicate 
how watchdogs think that success in the legal arena is a good indicator 
of their competence. 
Overall, the second-opinion effects reduce the “enforcement costs” of 
reputational systems: the costs of calibrating and carrying out responses 
to detected violations of market norms. In doing so, the second-opinion 
role of the law coexists and complements nicely the first-opinion role, in 
which the law helps market players detect violations. We cannot 
determine with certainty which of these two informational effects is 
more important, as both depend on the company and issue at hand.125 
But we can observe, more generally, a gradual shift in the informational 
role of the law: in the past, when markets and information technologies 
were not as developed, the role of the law in reputation markets was 
mostly to detect violations.126 Nowadays, the problem is not so much 
lack of information, but rather sorting out what pieces of information are 
more relevant and credible. In such an environment, adjudication does 
not break news, but rather serves as a second opinion, a safety valve that 
corrects market under- or over-reaction. 
C. Multiple Layers of Reputation Information 
So far we have examined how the legal system can help market 
players overcome problems with asymmetric information (through fact-
finding powers in discovery), judgment biases (through expert and 
experienced arbiters), and divergent incentives (through independent 
adjudication). But the legal system is not categorically better or more 
accurate than reputation systems. The legal system’s assessments 
sometimes suffer from distortions similar to the ones that plague 
reputation systems: asymmetric information, lack of expertise, strategic 
                                                     
124. From my anecdotal observation I found little to no reports of legal losses or frivolous suits. 
Watchdogs report only successes. And it seems like watchdogs take credit even for success stories 
to which they contributed marginally. The legal success-story signal is thus very noisy. It is better 
than no signal, though. Fly-by-night watchdogs are not able to boast a long list of legal success 
stories.  
125. To generalize: first-opinion effects are only relevant when negative events are likely to fly 
under the radar to begin with. And so the first-opinion role is less relevant when the misbehaving 
company is large or the defective product is widely sold. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 
1455; David W. Prince & Paul H. Rubin, The Effects of Product Liability Litigation on the Value of 
Firms, 4 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 44, 64–65 (2002). 
126. Indeed, this is the main theme of historical case studies of lex mercatoria, where judges did 
not sanction but provided information to other merchants on the misconduct of disputants. Law, 
supra note 74, at 745. 
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behavior, and divergent incentives. There exist ample situations where 
we cannot trust the legal system to produce the positive externality of 
accurate reputation information. And so I do not portray here a horserace 
over who produces better information, with the legal system winning. I 
rather portray the legal and market systems as providing multiple layers 
of reputation information. 
The value of the legal system to reputation systems stems largely 
from the fact that the systems’ distortions are imperfectly correlated. The 
market’s first opinion enjoys advantages in some areas and 
disadvantages in other areas compared to the legal system’s second 
opinion.127 The two systems in effect create one diversified portfolio of 
reputational assessments. Having different types of assessments mitigate 
the risk of extreme mistakes (that is, the risk that stakeholders will 
boycott perfectly good companies or interact with rotten companies). 
The idea of multiple layers of evaluations has been applied to similar 
contexts such as second opinions in medical treatment and user reviews 
in online commerce websites,128 and it lends itself nicely to our context. 
Consider for example the four traits that were identified as necessary for 
well-functioning reputation systems: the system has to produce 
information in a timely, accessible, accurate, and thorough manner.129 It 
is easy to envision how the market and legal system complement each 
other along these dimensions. The market system provides more timely 
and accessible information, striking fast whenever bad news breaks. The 
legal system then produces information that is often more accurate and 
complete than the market’s initial version. 
Granted, there are several specific factors that, when in play, severely 
limit the legal system’s ability to affect reputations. For one, information 
produced during litigation may be too lagged. Often the judge’s opinion 
comes a few years after the initial market reaction, when no one is 
interested in the matter anymore.130 But while the time lag indeed 
represents a strong limitation, we should not overstate it. Remember that 
the relevant event for the purpose of measuring the lag is not the day on 
which the legal case is decided, but rather any day on which the legal 
system injects information into the market. Many times valuable facts 
become available in the earlier stages of the litigation process. Judges 
also provide interpretations of how things happened long before the final 
                                                     
127. See id. at 752–53. 
128. See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 115, at 1435 n.1. 
129. See Liu, supra note 119, at 29–31 (Liu breaks down the dimension I refer to here as 
“thoroughness” into “interpretability” and “completeness”). 
130. See Ardia, supra note 67, at 314; Ide & Yarn, supra note 63, at 1139. 
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judicial opinion: adjudication often happens in multiple stages, and 
judges speak their mind during early stages such as motions to dismiss 
or class/derivative action approvals.131 
Another strong limitation of the second-opinion theory is that 
information produced in the courtroom may be too obscure, getting lost 
in translation on its way to market players. After all, individuals do not 
read judicial opinions and the media cover opinions only sparsely and 
distortedly. Indeed, we should acknowledge that litigation affects 
reputation only in a small subset of legal disputes (such as with big-firm 
defendants), which are interesting and important enough for third parties 
to follow.132 At the same time, though, not all the information that is 
produced in the courtroom gets lost on its way to the court of public 
opinion.133 
As I summed it elsewhere: “[o]verall, the existence of a well-
functioning legal system facilitates better reputation systems.”134 Still, in 
order to move from claims about the average and improve our ability to 
predict the reputational impact of specific disputes, we need to introduce 
more context-specific details and focus on one area of market activity 
and law at a time.135 The next Part shows how to apply the theory to 
specific contexts and identify the factors that determine the likely 
direction of reputational impact. 
III. WHAT DETERMINES THE MAGNITUDE AND DIRECTION 
OF REPUTATIONAL IMPACT 
So far we have kept a neat story for the sake of exposition: law 
enforcement actions produce as a byproduct a positive externality of 
reputation-shaping information. But in reality the story is much more 
                                                     
131. See Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Litigation Discovery and Corporate Governance: 
The Missing Story About the “Genius of American Corporate Law,” 63 EMORY L.J. 1383, 1431–40 
(2014); Klausner et al., supra note 115, at 1425. For example, during the process of approving class 
and derivative settlements, judges engage in an evaluation of the merits of the case, and some 
judges choose to publish relatively detailed records of their evaluations. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).  
132. See infra Appendix: List of Interviews, Interview with Richard Clary, Former Head of Litig., 
Cravath, Swaine & Moore (Nov. 16, 2012). Still, it makes sense to focus on the above-mentioned 
small subset because it represents the most meaningful and practically important instances of 
behavior control.  
133. See infra Part III. For example, the media disseminates information more accurately when 
they report about assessments of legal arbiters than when they are generating their own reputational 
assessments. This is because there is no inherent asymmetric information or ambiguity about 
information that is readily available, namely, what the judge wrote in the opinion. 
134. Shapira, supra note 90, at 25. 
135. Shapira, supra note 90, at 14.  
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complicated and context-specific. This Part fleshes out important factors 
to consider before applying the general theory to specific contexts. The 
Part especially emphasizes the forces that drive a wedge between 
information that is being produced in the legal system and stakeholders’ 
actual reputational decisions. A lot of information gets lost in translation 
from the courtroom to the court of public opinion: sometimes judicial 
scorning actually helps the company’s reputation, other times the 
company manages to hijack the information flow by producing 
smokescreens, and so forth. 
A. The Reputational Impact Depends on the Market Activity and 
Legal Field in Question 
The magnitude of reputational impact varies greatly across different 
types of legal disputes. One way to identify the conditions that determine 
whether a given dispute will affect reputations is to adopt a supply-and-
demand framework. “Demand” here denotes the extent to which third 
parties will be interested in reading what the legal system has to say 
about the litigants’ behaviors. Many types of legal disputes interest only 
the disputants themselves. Classic examples come from family law or 
torts committed by individuals. Demand for reputation-relevant 
information in such cases will be low. “Supply” denotes the extent to 
which the legal system can actually produce quality information for 
third-parties who are interested. We can envision a scenario such as 
medical malpractice litigation, where the demand is high yet supply is 
low. On one hand, the reputation of caregivers is very important to third 
parties and hard for them to assess. So the interest in hearing what the 
legal system has to say will be high. On the other hand, medical 
malpractice disputes—when they do not settle—are being decided by 
inexpert jurors who do not produce detailed opinions.136 The legal 
system thus supplies little meaningful reputation information. 
The legal system meaningfully impacts reputational sanctions only in 
areas with both high demand and good supply, namely, areas where 
market players are constantly looking to reevaluate their beliefs, and the 
legal institutions are perceived as a capable and credible source of 
information.137 One example of an area where both supply-and-demand 
                                                     
136.  See infra Appendix: List of Interviews, Telephone Interview with Jeff Segal, Founder, 
MedicalJustice (Nov. 27, 2012). 
137. See infra Appendix: List of Interviews, Telephone Interview with Jeff Segal, Founder, 
MedicalJustice (Nov. 27, 2012); Telephone Interview with Peter Grossi, Drug Liability Litigator 
(Dec. 12, 2012). In fact, one can claim that medical malpractice litigation only increases the costs of 
detection for reputation markets ex ante: doctors who anticipate the biased judgments of jurors 
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conditions are met is corporate and securities laws.138 Stakeholders who 
deal with large publicly traded companies have ample reason to 
continuously look for new information and interpretation on companies’ 
abilities and intentions, given the high stakes and various asymmetric 
information problems involved. And the players in the market—private 
intermediaries such as securities analysts or institutional investors—
enjoy enough sophistication and resources to mine legal proceedings for 
second opinions. Generally speaking, demand for reputation-relevant 
information on publicly-traded companies is high simply because 
players in the market are “more interested in the empirical truth and the 
de-biasing of information than consumers of news in other contexts.”139 
On the supply side, I articulated two reasons for why “the main 
adjudicators of corporate behavior—Delaware courts—are well 
positioned to provide timely, comprehensible, and thorough reputation 
information.”140 First, they are respected in legal and business 
communities.141 “The nonpolitical appointment process (Delaware 
judges frequently come from the bar) and the specialized docket allow 
judges to develop expertise and a broad perspective on market 
norms.”142 Second, they manage to avoid the time lag that usually 
accompanies litigation: “the specialized and small docket also enables 
Delaware judges to adjudicate disputes relatively quickly, producing 
                                                     
avoid fully reporting on their own errors (even when those errors were unavoidable) for fear of legal 
liability. Medical malpractice litigation, the argument goes, creates a “deny and defend” culture, 
which makes it even more difficult to get accurate reputational judgments to begin with. See 
generally Joanna C. Schwartz, A Dose of Reality for Medical Malpractice Reform, 88 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1224, 1227, 1239–43 (2013). 
138. See Shapira, supra note 90, at 14–15.  
139. Id. For evidence suggesting that sophisticated investors continuously monitor and react to 
information disseminated during litigation, see Vladimir Atanasov et al., Does Reputation Limit 
Opportunistic Behavior in the VC Industry? Evidence from Litigation Against VCs, 67 J. Fin. 2215 
(2012) (on venture capitalists’ reputation); Jeremiah Green et al., The Bad News Dissemination Bias 
in the Business Press 9 n.13 and accompanying text (Aug. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1780162 [https://perma.cc/QBB5-SEZY]; Lars H. Haβ & Maximilian A. 
Müller, Capital Market Consequences of Corporate Fraud (2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.eea-esem.com/files/papers/eea-esem/2012/988/paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK4N-
V9HS] (same argument applies also outside the VC context).  
140. Shapira, supra note 90, at 15. 
141. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 
UCLA L. Rev. 1009, 1102 (1997). 
142. Shapira, supra note 90, at 15. See David M. Wilson, Climate Change: The Real Threat to 
Delaware Corporate Law, Why Delaware Must Keep a Watchful Eye on the Content of Political 
Change in the Air, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 481, 486 (2010). 
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information in a timely manner.”143 To that we can add here a third 
point, namely, that the legal system is more likely to tell market players 
something they do not already know when the issue at hand concerns 
questions like what insiders knew and when they knew it (that is, issues 
that are usually the crux of streamlined discovery processes). This is 
why corporate law litigation usually provides valuable second opinions: 
it revolves around questions of management integrity. 
Finally, and more generally, another factor that enables relevant 
information production in corporate litigation is the legal doctrine. With 
open-ended legal standards, such as the good-faith doctrine employed by 
Delaware courts,144 judges enjoy more flexibility to tailor their own 
narrative of the events. Generally speaking, a negligence regime is more 
likely to supply information on how things happened than strict liability. 
In other areas the reputational impact comes not from litigation but 
rather from regulatory investigations. Product liability is a case in point: 
stakeholders could get most of the relevant information on a company’s 
reputation for product quality not from lagged litigation but rather from 
timely regulatory investigations. To illustrate, let us revisit the study on 
stock market reactions to airline crashes.145 The findings indicate that 
reputational sanctions in the airline industry are accurate, in the sense 
that stock prices of airlines plummeted only when crashes were at-
fault.146 But the biggest puzzle for our purposes is: how did the market 
know the causes of the crash with accuracy? In forty-one out of forty-
two crashes sampled, the Wall Street Journal journalist covering the 
crash knew to attribute the failure to the right cause.147 How so? Part of 
the reason is the specific issue at hand. It is hard to conceal information 
on the causes of airline crashes.148 Another part of the reason is the 
regulatory environment. The Federal Aviation Administration releases 
reports on crashes in a timely manner and determines with authority 
whether the crash was at-fault or not.149 Market players are likely to rely 
                                                     
143. Shapira, supra note 90, at 15. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in 
the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1086 (2000). 
144. See Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate Law, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 887, 888 (1999) (noting the heavy reliance on open-ended legal standards). 
145. See Mitchell & Maloney, supra note 26.  
146. See id. at 354. 
147. See id. at 340. 
148. Anat R. Admati, It Takes a Village to Maintain a Dangerous Financial System, in JUST 
FINANCIAL MARKET: FINANCE IN A JUST SOCIETY (Lisa Herzog, ed. forthcoming 2016) (manuscript 
at 2), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2787177 [https://perma.cc/J78C-R28A]. 
149. See Aviation Accident Reports, NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., http://www.ntsb.gov/ 
investigations/reports_aviation.html [https://perma.cc/SQX3-CUNZ] (last visited Aug. 27, 2015). 
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on these reports ex post, and the mere anticipation of such reports likely 
disciplines the market ex ante.150 
While the supply-and-demand framework helps us predict the 
magnitude of reputational impact, it does not tell us what the direction 
will be. Does litigation necessarily increase the reputational sanction 
attached to misconduct? Does it affect the reputations of individuals 
differently than it affects organizations? The next sections answer these 
questions. 
B. Litigation Affects the Reputation of Individuals Differently than It 
Affects Companies 
When analyzing reputational impact we have to distinguish between 
individual- and organizational-level reputations. Legal scholars tend to 
assume that any judicial scorning of individuals reflects badly on their 
companies.151 And granted, in many cases this intuitive assumption 
holds. Yet, as reputation and crisis management scholars have long 
recognized, scolding an individual does not necessarily impact the 
company’s reputation negatively.152 In general, factors such as the 
scolded individual’s place in the hierarchy, whether the individual still 
holds office, or what other top managers knew about that individual’s 
actions, play an important role in dictating the link between individual 
scolding and corporate reputation.153 Specifically in the context of 
litigation, we can envision common scenarios where dressing down 
specific managers may actually boost the company’s reputation (or at 
least not hurt it).154 
First, singling out an individual for scorning may facilitate 
scapegoating dynamics. In typical corporate litigation scenarios—
class/derivative actions —the claim is often jumpstarted by a sharp 
decline in stock prices (which constitutes the harm to the investor and 
draws the attention of plaintiff lawyers). And because the stock price 
decline is likely to push the manager out, by the time judges get to write 
                                                     
150. In a similar vein, consider the case of Audi’s self-accelerating cars. There, a large part of the 
correction to the initial market overreaction came after a regulatory report clarified that the fault did 
not lie with Audi.  
151. But see Skeel, supra note 32, at 1855. 
152. See DEZENHALL & WEBER, supra note 57, at 140; E. Deanne Brocato et al., When Things 
Go Wrong: Account Strategy Following a Corporate Crisis Event, 15 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 35, 
36 (2012) (“Both theoretical and empirical research on corporate crises suggest that individuals and 
corporations may be viewed differently when evaluated, following a corporate crisis event . . . . ”). 
153. See Shapira, supra note 90, at 19–20.  
154. Id. at 19–21.  
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their opinions they probably dress down a manager who is already gone 
or on the way out of the company. While such judicial scorning probably 
hurts the ousted manager’s chances of getting rehired (that is, hurts the 
manager’s labor-market reputation), it could help repair the company’s 
reputation. To understand why, note that the crisis management 
literature considers “decoupling” as one of the most effective recovery 
strategies for companies.155 In decoupling mode, the company is 
acknowledging the problem while isolating and localizing it, conveying 
a message along the lines of “this is not who we are as a company going 
forward.”156 Assigning blame to a single individual who was since 
purged from the company can be an especially effective form of 
decoupling, as long as the public believes it.157 Thus, when judges single 
out the ousted manager for opprobrium, they lend credibility to the 
scapegoating attempts, thereby helping the company distance itself from 
the wrongdoing. 
Another common occurrence in judicial scolding involves criticizing 
a manager for making mistakes out of incompetence. Here again, the 
individual’s chances of being rehired would probably go down as a 
result of litigation. But the impact on the company’s reputation is not 
necessarily negative, and could even be positive. Crisis management 
experts maintain that companies in crises stand a better chance of 
repairing their reputation when individual managers are portrayed as less 
than perfect.158 I explained it elsewhere:159 
If stakeholders perceive the leader as perfect and in total control, 
they assume that she could have prevented the adverse outcome. 
As a result, stakeholders will interpret the company’s 
misconduct as intentional and indicative of future behavior (that 
is, arising from deep-rooted disregard for shareholder interests 
and market norms in general). By contrast, if stakeholders 
perceive the leader as less than perfect, they are more likely to 
                                                     
155. See, e.g., Anna Lamin & Srilata Zaheer, Wall Street vs. Main Street: Firm Strategies for 
Defending Legitimacy and Their Impact on Different Stakeholders, 23 ORG. SCI. 47, 61 (2012). 
156. Id. 
157. Cf. Celia Moore et al., Avoiding the Consequences of Misconduct: Becoming Licensed by 
and Insulated from Stigma 10–11 (Working Paper, 2011) (on file with Washington Law Review) 
(finding evidence that firing a CEO before announcing failures reduces the reputational harm for the 
company). 
158. See DEZENHALL & WEBER, supra note 57.  
159. See Shapira, supra note 90, at 20.  
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interpret the adverse outcomes as a result of more easily fixable 
mistakes.160 
The Disney opinion illustrates scapegoating dynamics in play.161 
Dozens of law review articles referred to the Chancellor’s unusual style 
of scolding, with caustic and catchable criticisms.162 But while the 
reputation-damaging effects of the opinion were widely recognized, one 
aspect of it has been grossly overlooked: whose reputation got damaged 
exactly? Who were the targets of the scolding? The Chancellor’s 
strongest criticisms were reserved for six individuals: the CEO, three 
other directors who should have done more to prevent the debacle, and 
two non-directors—the general counsel and an outside compensation 
expert—who did not provide full information.163 As I summed it 
elsewhere:164 
All six of these scolded businesspeople have one thing in 
common: none of them were any longer an integral part of 
Disney when the verdict was issued. The Disney 2005 board 
contained many directors who were part of the company in the 
Ovitz debacle days. Yet none of the retained individuals were 
scolded. The scolding was reserved for individuals who were 
already ousted or on their way out.165 
This previously unnoticed fact suggests that scapegoating dynamics 
were in place: the company’s reputation for management integrity stood 
to gain from the scolding of ousted individuals. 
                                                     
160. Cf. KIMBERLY D. ELSBACH, ORGANIZATIONAL PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT 60 (2006). See 
generally John Hendry, The Principal’s Other Problems: Honest Incompetence and the 
Specification of Objectives, 27 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 98 (2002) (identifying contexts where 
shareholders can more easily replace an incompetent element than root out moral hazard). To be 
sure, in the business world it is sometimes better to be (perceived as) immoral than incompetent. 
Still, there are areas where incompetence is considered less deep-seated and easier to root out than 
lack of integrity.  
161. The details in this paragraph are based on Shapira, supra note 90, at 33–36. 
162. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 763 (Del. Ch. 2005) (describing 
Eisner as a man who “enthroned himself as the omnipotent and infallible monarch of his personal 
Magic Kingdom”); see, e.g., Omari S. Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware’s 
Dominance and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 1178 (2008) (“The 
Disney litigation illustrates that, even where a decision does not result in liability for board 
members, embarrassing details of corporate dysfunction may tarnish a company’s reputation.”). 
163. See Shapira, supra note 90, at 34. 
164. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
165. See Shapira, supra note 90, at 34 (footnote omitted) (citing THE WALT DISNEY CO., 2005 
ANNUAL REPORT 100 (2005), http://cdn.media.ir.thewaltdisneycompany.com/2005/annual/ar-
2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/EMW2-KJE4]). 
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And indeed, the media coverage of Disney following the Chancellor’s 
opinion was much more favorable than before the opinion.166 The 
verdict itself was presented as a victory for Disney and its incumbent 
board, albeit a blow to Eisner’s individual reputation on his way out of 
the company.167 And a few weeks later the media was already publishing 
stories about how Disney had learned from its past and quickly changed 
its ways, explicitly referring to Disney as the poster child of a corporate 
governance turnaround: “The bad company of the 1990s turned into the 
role model of the 2000s.”168 
C. The Process of Litigation Matters More than Its Outcomes 
When we think about the reputational impact of litigation we usually 
focus on judicial opinions: how the outcomes (legal sanctions) or content 
(judicial remarks) of opinions shape the reputation of defendants.169 But 
in reality judicial opinions are rare. Most legal disputes settle.170 Yet 
even cases that settle sometimes affect the market reaction: the process 
itself prior to settlements (pleading, discovery, and trial) sheds light on 
reputation-relevant information. 
To illustrate, recall that the Odwalla lawsuit settled, but not before the 
discovery process corrected the initial market reaction by flushing out 
important information.171 Another example comes from Selmi’s study of 
stock market reaction to settlements of racial discrimination class 
actions.172 The study indicates that similar cases with similar legal 
outcomes yielded different market reactions, depending on what 
information was produced prior to settlement.173 For example, Texaco’s 
reputation took a hit when the media reported about a tape with explicit 
racial slurs that was exposed in discovery.174 And we now have 
systematic indications that sophisticated market players indeed 
                                                     
166. Id. 
167. Id.  
168. Id.  
169. See, e.g., Rock, supra note 141, at 1016 (reputational sanctions are affected by the content of 
opinions); Wiesenfeld et al., supra note 25, at 244 (reputational sanctions are affected by legal 
sanctions). 
170. See J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil Settlement, 91 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 59, 61 n.2 (2016).   
171. See Marler, supra note 86. 
172. See Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment 
Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1249 (2003). 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 1270–72. 
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constantly monitor disputes and react to events during the early stages of 
the process.175 
Note that the litigation process’s impact on reputation differs 
markedly from the impact of judicial opinions. The process mainly 
affects what information is diffused, while judicial opinions mainly 
affect how information is diffused.176 In disputes with large, publicly 
traded firms, market players will likely have access to the basic facts 
about the misbehavior before a lawsuit is even filed. Still, information 
produced during pleading, discovery, and trial can give market players 
more raw facts and inside information to work with, such as internal e-
mail communications or board minutes that provide details about what 
top managers did (or did not do) to prevent the failure. By the time 
judicial opinions are released in such disputes, they probably contain 
mostly stale information; stakeholders with enough stake and expertise 
to mine verdicts for information could have already accessed prior 
sources for the same information. To be sure, verdicts still matter in the 
court of public opinion. But they matter in different and hitherto 
understudied ways. The main impact of verdicts is not in introducing 
new information but rather in affecting how existing information is 
diffused.177 
                                                     
175. See Atanasov et al., supra note 139 (noting that events in the early stages of venture capital 
litigation affect the venture capitalists’ reputation). In an interview conducted with a representative 
of Courtroom Connect—a company that streams online webcasts of Delaware trials—I learned that 
an important clientele of streaming services is institutional investors who monitor legal disputes in 
real time and alter investment decisions accordingly.  
176. See generally TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE (2008) (describing 
how litigation affects not just the facts we have, but also framing and media attention for these 
facts); Wagner, supra note 76, at 713–27. This subpart corresponds with an abbreviated subpart in 
Shapira, supra note 95, at 21–23.  
177. Law and economics scholars have traditionally ignored issues of how information is 
diffused. See Dyck & Zingales, supra note 40, at 108–09. It is time we incorporate the burgeoning 
evidence on the effects of framing and scope of diffusion. For instance, financial economists have 
been consistently showing that the scope and tone of media coverage moves stock market prices 
even when the media reports contain no new information. One classic study found that a front-page 
New York Times article about a biotech company caused the stock prices to skyrocket, even though 
the article contained no new information and was actually repeating information that the Times had 
previously published in a back-page story. See Gur Huberman & Tomer Regev, Contagious 
Speculation and a Cure for Cancer: A Nonevent that Made Stock Prices Soar, 56 J. FIN. 387, 387–
90 (2001). More generally, see Bushee et al., supra note 43, at 12–13 (coverage by mass media 
affects stock returns even when not breaking new information); Lily Fang & Joel Peress, Media 
Coverage and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns, 64 J. FIN. 2023 (2009) (same); Paul C. Tetlock, 
Does Public Financial News Resolve Asymmetric Information?, 24 Rev. Fin. Stud. 3520 (2010); 
Paul Ma, Information or Spin? Evidence from Language Differences Between 8-Ks and Press 
Releases (Nov. 29, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://server1.tepper.cmu.edu/seminars/docs/ 
Ma%20Job%20Market%20Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/5THU-64WM]. The scope of media 
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Consider how litigation can shape the scope and content of media 
coverage through three channels that do not involve producing new 
information: saliency, credibility, and framing. First, litigation or 
regulatory investigations may raise the saliency of an issue. A certain 
issue may be long past its days in the sun when a lagged judicial opinion 
enlivens the media attention to it, providing the media reporters with 
readymade quotes sheltered from defamation liability.178 
Second, judicial opinions change reputations through certifying 
existing information. This is the source-credibility effect. Psychologists 
and communication scholars have long recognized that not all sources of 
information are created equal. The same piece of information may be 
discounted when coming from a non-credible source, yet move the 
needle when coming from a credible one.179 When well-respected judges 
put their name on a certain version of the events, stakeholders are more 
likely to update their beliefs based on it. 
Finally, both the earlier stages in the process and the judicial opinion 
affect reputations through framing: producing readily available 
packaging of the facts. Plaintiffs, defendants, and third-party 
intermediaries may use tidbits from earlier stages (complaint, motion to 
dismiss, expert testimonies) to help their specific interpretations gain 
traction in the court of public opinion. And the judge’s version also 
affects how market players package an existing set of facts in their 
minds. Here, however, other noteworthy dynamics come into play: the 
framing effects of verdicts work in counterintuitive ways, as the next 
section explains. 
D. Legal Outcomes Are Imperfectly Correlated with Reputational 
Outcomes 
After the previous section acknowledged that legal outcomes are not 
the only factor correlated with reputational outcomes, the present section 
spotlights a closely related phenomenon: sometimes legal outcomes are 
even negatively correlated with reputational outcomes. Two enforcement 
actions with identical legal outcomes may generate completely different 
reputational outcomes. This is because the legal outcome of a case is 
                                                     
coverage affects the market by drawing the attention of more investors to information that was 
previously known only to a small group of sophisticated investors. 
178. See LYTTON, supra note 176, at 94–95; Frankel, supra note 76, at 357. 
179. See DellaVigna & Gentzkow, supra note 39, at 657; Cass R. Sunstein, Opinion, Breaking up 
the Echo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2012, at A25 (people revisit their priors only when information 
comes from “surprising validators”). 
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based on specific legal doctrines that may not be relevant to the 
stakeholders’ reputation evaluation. For example, a judge may rule in 
favor of the defendant company, yet the judicial opinion will contain 
harsh remarks indicating that the company disregarded market norms, 
though it fell short of violating legal rules. In such cases, the legal 
consequences will be positive but the reputational consequences 
negative. Conversely, a judge may assign liability to the company, but 
the opinion will make clear that the misbehavior was carried out by a 
rogue employee and is unlikely to reoccur. In that case the legal 
consequences will be negative but the reputational consequences are 
likely to be positive. 
Indeed, various empirical studies of stock market reactions to 
enforcement actions show that there is no systematic correlation between 
the size of the legal sanction and that of the reputational sanction.180 To 
further illustrate we need simply revisit the Salomon Brothers case. As 
mentioned, the market reacted very positively to Salomon’s settlement 
with the regulators.181 But the positive reaction cannot be attributed to 
the legal outcome: Salomon agreed to pay what was then the second-
highest fine ever paid in SEC settlements, and had to double its initial 
charge-out (indicating a higher-than-expected legal sanction).182 The 
positive market reaction is therefore more likely attributable to the 
information contained in the settlement announcement, which suggested 
that Salomon’s past mistakes are not indicative of how the company is 
managed now.183 Another example—the Bankers Trust litigation—
illustrates the flip side.184 There, a financial giant won a series of legal 
battles, but the legal victory proved pyrrhic. The process of litigation 
exposed the pervasiveness of a sucker-punching culture in Bankers 
Trust, thus greatly damaging the firm’s reputation. 
                                                     
180. See Atanasov et al., supra note 139 (on venture capital litigation); Wallace N. Davidson III 
et al., The Effectiveness of OSHA Penalties: A Stock-Market-Based Test, 33 INDUS. REL. 283, 292–
93 (1994) (on enforcement by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration); Bruce Haslem, 
Managerial Opportunism During Corporate Litigation, 60 J. FIN. 2013 (2005) (on private litigation 
in the U.S.); John Armour et al., Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial 
Markets (Mar. 9, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1678028 
[https://perma.cc/S4Q9-BJA7] (on enforcement by the United Kingdom’s FSA). 
181. See Paine & Santoro, supra note 102, at 19–20. 
182. Id. 
183. See supra section II.B.2.  
184. See MACEY, supra note 1, at 71–74. 
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E. The Information Flow from the Courtroom Gets Distorted 
So far we have assumed that stakeholders use information from the 
legal system to revisit their reputational assessments. But in reality 
information from the courtroom does not simply find its way to 
stakeholders intact. Individuals rarely read unfiltered court opinions or 
regulatory reports. They depend on information intermediaries to 
process and disseminate the main sound bites for them. Yet 
intermediaries have their own narrow interests to select what parts to 
highlight and then add their own take. And the misbehaving companies 
themselves also distort the information flow. As a result, a lot of 
information gets lost in translation. Consider two especially notable 
patterns. 
First, different types of intermediaries—such as law firms, business 
media, or regular newspapers—select different pieces of information to 
convey to their respective audiences. Take for example the lessons 
learned from my analysis of the coverage of the Disney litigation.185 Big 
Law firms tend to send “a memorandum to our clients” following 
significant cases, and did so with Disney as well.186 When I sampled 
these memos, I discovered an “all-rules” approach: the law firms 
focused on what the verdict means for directors facing similar situations 
in the future in general terms.187 They largely refrained from relaying the 
detailed narrative of what and how things happened in Disney. By 
contrast, the newspaper coverage of the Disney decision focused more 
on the judge’s comments and vivid descriptions rather than on the legal 
doctrines.188 Even there, different types of media outlets produced 
markedly different types of coverage. The business media’s coverage 
was more favorable to Disney than the regular media’s coverage.189 
Business newspapers were forward-looking: they focused on how the 
bottom line of the verdict is good for Disney and its current directors 
going forward, while associating the caustic criticism in the verdict with 
the retiring CEO.190 Regular newspapers, by contrast, were more 
                                                     
185. See Shapira, supra note 90, at 36–37. 
186. Rock, supra note 141, at 1070; Memorandum from Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, The Disney 
Case, The Bus. Judgment Rule and the Importance of Process (Aug. 12, 2005) (on file with 
Washington Law Review).  
187. See Shapira, supra note 90, at 36–37. 
188. Id.   
189. Id.  
190. Id.; see, e.g., Christopher Parkes, Eisner’s Disney Reign Cut down in Court, FIN. TIMES 
(Aug. 15, 2005, 5:14 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/1/38d063d2-0cdd-11da-ba02-00000e 
2511c8.html#axzz3mOoHmg75 [https://perma.cc/G5XR-QBJN].  
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backward-looking: they focused on the crushing criticism delivered in 
the verdict, and painted it as bad for everyone involved.191 
The variation in the coverage of verdicts carries important 
implications for reputational outcomes. Reputational outcomes vary 
across the company’s different audiences, as each stakeholder group 
typically taps different intermediaries for information. To illustrate: 
directors who read just the law firms’ memos will have different 
perceptions of the company than investors who read the Wall Street 
Journal or customers who read the Huffington Post online. In the Disney 
case, the reputational outcomes were likely “zero for audiences relying 
on law firms’ coverage; negative for audiences relying on regular 
newspapers; and mixed (or even positive) for audiences relying on 
business newspapers.”192 The upshot is that future analyses of the 
reputational impact of litigation should distinguish between different 
types of audiences and sources of diffusion of reputation-relevant 
information.193 
A second important factor to consider is defendant companies’ 
attempts to produce smokescreens that divert the public’s attention away 
from bad information coming out of the courtroom. To go back to the 
Disney example: the verdict was not the only newsworthy event 
affecting Disney’s reputation at the time. At the exact day that the 
verdict was released, Disney issued a quarterly report announcing strong 
earnings growth.194 The media attention quickly turned away from the 
verdict and to these positive announcements. Disney’s stakeholders 
ended up reading a commingled story of earning announcement and a 
verdict, framed by the media as a good day overall for Disney.195 
                                                     
191. See Shapira, supra note 90, at 36–37; An Seon-Kyoung & Karla K. Gower, How Do the 
News Media Frame Crises? A Content Analysis of Crisis News Coverage, 35 PUB. REL. REV. 107 
(2009) (finding that in general business newspapers tend to adopt an “economic” frame when 
reporting about crises while regular newspapers adopt a “morality” frame). 
192. See Shapira, supra note 90, at 37. 
193. In other words, any analysis of reputational impact should ask “reputation to whom”? “For 
what”? FOMBRUN, supra note 102, at 395–96. Companies and businessmen may exit litigation with 
a stellar reputation among one group of stakeholders but a tarnished reputation among another.  
194. See Shapira, supra note 90, at 37–38. 
195. See Kate Kelly, Disney Earnings Jump on Gains from TV Division, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 
2005, at A3 (“Disney’s upbeat earnings announcement came on the heels of another victory for the 
company: a Delaware judge’s ruling that Disney’s directors didn’t breach their fiduciary 
duty . . . .”); Rupert Steiner, Record Profits Put the Smile Back at Disney, SUNDAY BUS. (Aug. 18, 
2005), http://billingsgazette.com/business/record-profits-put-the-smile-back-at-disney/article_ 
c0ec283c-a07e-5b52-9162-322fa61fc960.html [https://perma.cc/K2JM-JKM2] (“[H]ours after [the] 
ruling, all eyes from Wall Street were on the media group’s stellar third-quarter results.”). 
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Encountering the overlooked smokescreen angle of the Disney story 
illustrates that reputational sanctions are not a one-sided event. 
Companies have the incentives and ability (think public relations 
departments) to hijack unfavorable information flows. When discussing 
the informational role of the law we should therefore consider what 
conditions make information flows more (or less) likely to get hijacked 
by companies. My initial conjecture, following my research of the 
Disney case, was that “companies control the information flows from 
verdicts better than they control information flows from continuous 
discovery or trial processes. Verdicts are one-time, isolated events, so 
companies can more easily produce a timely smokescreen, issuing an 
unrelated press release to steer media attention away from the 
verdict.”196 
At first glance, the observed distortions in information flows cast a 
doubt on the legal system’s ability to impact reputational sanctions. It 
can be argued that the media will not widely diffuse corrections of 
market overreactions (because nuanced, contextual explanations do not 
sell newspapers like vivid, template-like allegations), and that 
companies’ smokescreens will prevent corrections of market under-
reaction. However, a deeper look reveals a “multiple layers” dynamic: 
the distortions in information flows are imperfectly correlated and 
somewhat balance each other. When the media fails to fully diffuse 
information that is favorable to companies, the companies themselves 
have incentives and resources to make sure that stakeholders get the 
message. To illustrate, recall how Audi purchased full-page ads in major 
newspapers to increase the public exposure to the exonerating regulatory 
report.197 The Exxon Valdez spill serves as another good illustration. 
Exxon’s spokespersons continue to refer to parts of the judicial opinion 
in the spill-damages litigation that commended Exxon. For example, 
when an Alaskan politician brought up the Exxon failure in 2004, the 
company issued a press release quoting the judicial opinion, suggesting 
that no one can claim that they are the bad guys anymore.198 And in 
                                                     
196. Shapira, supra note 90, at 38. Several empirical studies have recently fleshed out the 
different ways in which firms try to control the information flow of bad news to the market: 
bundling bad news with good news, releasing bad news at times when investor attention is 
distracted, and so forth. See generally Lauren Cohen et al., Playing Favorites: How Firms Prevent 
the Revelation of Bad News 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-021, 2014), 
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11508220. [https://perma.cc/DUB9-Y7WE]. 
197. HUBER, supra note 58, at 57–74; Farrell, supra note 58, at 55. 
198. See Press Release, ExxonMobil, ExxonMobil Sets Valdez Record Straight (Oct. 6, 2004), 
http://ir.exxonmobil.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=115024&p=irol-
newsArticle_print&ID=624293&highlight [https://perma.cc/8ZGJ-3NNA]. 
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instances where companies try to prevent unfavorable information flows, 
sophisticated intermediaries have incentives to expose the company for 
the “villain” that it is (recall the Odwalla example). 
F. Managers Often Fail to Maximize the Reputational Outcomes for 
Their Companies 
So far our discussion has implicitly assumed that corporate insiders 
try to maximize the firm’s reputation. In reality, though, managers may 
protect their own reputation at the expense of the company’s reputation. 
Agency problems that plague large corporations loom even larger at 
times of crisis and legal disputes. Decision-makers facing an end-game 
situation think even more than usual about their own interests instead of 
the company’s interests.199 For instance, corporate managers may push 
for early settlements even when litigation can recover damage to the 
company’s reputation.200 This is because litigation may harm the 
managers’ individual reputation or because litigation may increase the 
chances that managers will have to pay out of pocket.201 Future work on 
the relationship between law and reputation should therefore find a way 
to incorporate agency considerations. 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
If indeed the legal system produces a positive externality of valuable 
reputation information, the implications for policy-making can be 
significant. Granted, reputational sanctions follow fuzzy dynamics and 
do not lend themselves easily to generalizations. It is therefore hard to 
provide clear-cut normative solutions or specific design details. 
Nevertheless, there are at least two general policy implications that we 
can sketch here—two areas where the reputational perspective offers 
new ways to look at problems. First, I call for a more cautious approach 
when advocating for nonintervention. Scaling back legal intervention 
may have an indirect negative effect on deterrence by raising the costs of 
                                                     
199. See generally Scott D. Graffin et al., Untangling Executive Reputation and Corporate 
Reputation: Who Made Who?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 221 
(Timothy G. Pollock & Michael L. Barnett eds., 2012) (theory); Brocato et al., supra note 152, at 36 
(evidence). 
200. Cf. Haslem, supra note 180 (finding that legal disputes that culminate in verdicts are better 
for shareholder value than disputes that culminate in settlements, and that the effect is more 
pronounced in companies with weaker corporate governance). 
201. Under the common insurance policy, managers have incentives to settle without paying out 
of pocket. STEVE ALBRECHT, CRISIS MANAGEMENT FOR CORPORATE SELF-DEFENSE 180–81 (1996) 
(insurance considerations sometimes trump corporate reputation considerations).  
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non-legal sanctions. Second, legal institutions—such as pleading 
standards—need to be rethought according to how they affect the 
quantity and quality of information production. 
A. Cautioning Against Reducing Legal Intervention 
The most basic policy implication stems from my motivation in 
writing this Article: to correct the flawed assumption current in the 
economic analysis of law that legal and non-legal systems of control are 
independent of each other. Previous analyses have rested on the 
assumption that whenever we recognize an area with strong reputational 
concerns, we can afford to scale back liability law (since the reputational 
forces will carry the burden of deterrence).202 But, as this Article shows, 
scaling back legal intervention may have an indirect negative effect on 
deterrence by raising the costs of non-legal (reputational) sanctions.203 
Reputational sanctions are costly, and their costs are a function of the 
shadow of the existing legal regime. Without the background threat of 
litigation, the market reactions to failures may become more cacophonic 
and distorted.204 
A related stream of economic analysis of law and social norms calls 
not for eliminating litigation altogether, but rather calibrating and 
deducting legal sanctions so as to internalize the benefits of non-legal 
sanctions.205 But even with this more modest proposal, the reality of 
reputational sanctions calls for a more cautious approach. For example, 
Cooter and Porat’s model nicely incorporates the benefits of non-legal 
sanctions, but overlooks certain types of costs, such as the costs of 
market over-deterrence. To the extent that we want to calibrate legal 
sanctions, we need to account for the full array of social costs exacted by 
reputational sanctions. 
                                                     
202. See supra note 6 (listing examples); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1. 
203. See generally Ganuza et al., supra note 32 (product liability reduces the costs of reputational 
sanctions).  
204. To be sure, the options for scaling back legal intervention are on a continuum. The choice is 
not between totally eliminating liability law and doing nothing. A costly litigation regime may be 
better than a no-liability regime because it facilitates market forces. But perhaps we can think of a 
less costly legal regime that would correct market forces just as adequately.  
205. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 37, at 413–14. 
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B. Rethinking Key Civil Procedure Doctrines 
The reputational impact of litigation depends not just on the legal 
outcomes, but also—indeed, more so—on the process itself.206 If we 
want to increase the quantity and quality of information production, we 
need to focus not on liability rules but rather on procedural doctrines 
such as pleading standards or plaintiffs’ rights to demand inside 
information in discovery. This Part reconsiders the desirability of key 
civil procedure doctrines from the reputational perspective, evaluating 
how they affect information production.207 
1. Settlement vs. Trial 
By emphasizing the informational role of litigation, this Article 
flushes out one previously overlooked advantage of full trials: 
facilitating better reputational deterrence. Full trials produce more high-
quality, publicly available information than disputes that settle early or 
are resolved in less public ways. The efficacy of dispute resolution 
channels depends not just on the costs and benefits to the parties to a 
specific dispute, but also on the costs and benefits to society at large. 
Indeed, previous accounts of the settlement versus trial debate have 
mentioned several public goods of trials, such as setting clear legal 
precedents and notifying other potential victims of their legal rights.208 
But trials also supply a different type of public good—not a “legal” but a 
“reputational” one: trials make it easier for outside observers to evaluate 
the quality of companies and businesspeople. Settlements are bound to 
under-produce reputation-relevant information. When parties to legal 
                                                     
206. See supra Part III. 
207. There are several broader points here. When we think of the design of legal institutions, we 
usually have in mind goals such as compensation and (direct) deterrence. It is possible, however, 
that for a subset of cases, the previously overlooked benefits from facilitating non-legal deterrence 
outweigh the traditional benefits. This will necessitate rethinking basic institutions. For example, in 
big cases where the pre-trial information is extremely noisy and the stakes are high, we would want 
the legal system to produce an assessment with a shorter time lag. Furthermore, while this section 
focuses on changes to court procedures, there is also the intuitive possibility of changing substantive 
law to enhance the accuracy of reputational sanctions. Most of our discussion has revolved around 
the possibility that liability law corrects reputation as a byproduct, but there are more direct ways to 
produce reputation information. For example, a social planner who worries about reputational over-
deterrence can reform defamation law to make it a more effective tool for companies to recover 
reputational harm. Alternatively, the planner could come up with a more tailored procedure that 
would allow attacked companies to initiate a fact-finding investigation into the merits of the attack 
on them. Delving into the endless moving parts of such suggestions is beyond the scope of this 
Article, however.  
208. See Shavell, supra note 37, at 606–07. 
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disputes decide whether to settle, they do not internalize all the benefits 
from the informational value of full trials and verdicts. The benefits of 
better information on corporate behavior accrue to all market 
participants, while the costs of full trials fall mostly on the litigants. 
Even worse, litigants may sometimes even try to limit the information 
production. We can envision a scenario in which the defendant company 
pushes for a settlement precisely because it wants to prevent unfavorable 
information from getting out. At the same time, plaintiffs may not care 
whether the relevant information gets out to third parties, as long as they 
are getting money.209 
To clarify, I do not present here a categorical argument against (or 
for) settlements. There are many other considerations in play, and my 
point is only to spotlight a previously overlooked factor. More 
concretely, recognizing the informational role of trials could help us 
think about what type of settlement procedures we want. For example, 
certain types of settlements must be approved by judges—most notably 
for our purposes, class and derivative actions.210 When judges assess 
whether to approve these settlements, they supposedly already incur the 
costs of gathering information about the dispute.211 This puts judges in a 
position to provide valuable information to the market. One concrete 
policy implication, then, concerns the duty of reasoning: we should 
encourage more detailed reasoning in judicial approvals of settlements, 
so that more relevant information will be accessible to market players.212 
2. Openness of Proceedings 
Directly related to our last point on accessibility of information is the 
debate on secrecy versus openness of proceedings. Legal scholars 
arguing in favor of open court proceedings usually emphasize how 
openness makes legal sanctions more accurate, such as by facilitating 
better checks on legal arbiters and inducing more victims to come 
                                                     
209. Id. at 605. 
210. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
211. See Law, supra note 126, at 745–46. 
212. Of course, there is a trade-off here, with many other considerations. For example, gathering 
information in a preliminary stage with no adversarial conflict may be costly. The judge’s 
assessment of how the company behaved may thus be worthless. Compare Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action Settlements, J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 167, 182 
(2009), with BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, MANAGING CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION 10–15 (2d ed. 2009).  
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forward and claim their rights.213 But openness could also make non-
legal sanctions more accurate, such as by drawing attention to unnoticed 
misconduct or helping market players get better information on noticed 
misconduct. All else being equal, the informational value of the law 
represents another previously overlooked argument against confidential 
litigation. 
3. Pleading Standards 
The recent Supreme Court decisions in Twombly and Iqbal sparked 
one of the most practical and heated debates in the legal world today: 
heightened versus liberal pleading standards.214 The debate revolves 
around arguments such as conserving judicial resources, protecting 
defendants from frivolous lawsuits, and allowing access to justice.215 
This Article suggests one more important factor to consider: heightened 
pleading standards affect information production negatively, thus 
indirectly hurting reputational deterrence. To understand why, recall our 
discussion about how the earlier stages in the process often produce 
most of the reputation-relevant information.216 In large-scale disputes—
where the misconduct is already revealed prior to litigation—the legal 
system’s comparative advantage (that is, the chance that litigation will 
teach market players something they do not already know) comes from 
discovery. Heightened pleading standards reduce the chances that these 
cases will reach discovery, thus reducing the chances that new light will 
be shed on the misconduct.217 
Here, again, a modification and clarification are in order. In most 
cases the reputational considerations are irrelevant (outside observers do 
not monitor them), and so my argument for liberal pleading standards 
does not apply. Nor do I suggest that screening frivolous lawsuits is 
unimportant. All I am suggesting is to include an overlooked factor in 
the cost-benefit analysis, namely, the benefit of producing information 
                                                     
213. See Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time to Let Some Sun 
Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 463, 469 (2006). 
214. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 
(2009); Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and 
Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2274 (2011). 
215. See, e.g., Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contracting Around Twombly, 60 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1, 1 (2010).  
216. See supra section III.C. 
217. The argument here applies to broader issues with multistage adjudication. See generally 
Louis Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1179 (2012). The decision when to 
invest resources in formal (legal) adjudication generates indirect consequences on informal 
(reputational) adjudication.  
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that helps market players assess companies (a positive externality of 
sorts). Concretely, a potential solution is to tailor different pleading 
standards based on the dispute’s impact on third parties. On paper, we 
can identify a subset of cases—say well-publicized cases with large 
companies—where it is best to screen suits at a later stage (not at the 
motion to dismiss but rather at the summary judgment stage). 
4. Language for Condemning Wrongdoing 
The legal system’s ability to produce valuable information to third 
parties depends also on the language that judges use. In order for the 
information to affect third-parties’ beliefs, it has to be not just available 
and accurate, but also accessible and comprehensible.218 Adherence to 
rigid doctrines and technical language will hurt the potential to correct 
reputation. In areas where the demand for reputation-correcting is great, 
we should therefore consider calibrating the legal language in a manner 
that is more relevant to market players. Think for example of moving 
from “liable”/“not liable” dichotomy to a “liability disproved”/ “liability 
unproved”/ “liability proved” system.219 
5. A Caveat on Selection Effects 
Any proposal to tweak legal institutions so as to induce more 
information production should come with a caveat: generating more 
information in given cases (ex post) may change future defendants’ 
incentives to select into litigation to begin with (ex ante). A social 
planner who will increase the openness of proceedings, liberalize 
pleading standards, and demand more detailed judicial reasoning in 
settlement approvals may raise the costs of litigation to companies (due 
to an increased risk of reputational fallout). Defendant companies may 
then change their behavior accordingly, opting out of public dispute 
resolutions. In other words, straight policy implications are problematic 
in this area. We need to find the elusive balance between more accuracy 
in given disputes and selection effects in future disputes.220 
                                                     
218. See Law, supra note 74, at 749. 
219. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 37, at 420 n.22. 
220. Cf. Scott A. Baker & Anup Malani, Does Accuracy Improve the Information Value of 
Trials? 1–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 17036, 2011), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17036 [https://perma.cc/5443-PBB3]. 
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V. SYNTHESIS: APPLICATIONS AND THEIR RELATION TO 
THE EXTANT LITERATURE 
The best way to synthesize and clarify this Article’s original 
contributions is to juxtapose it with the extant related literature. While 
most legal scholars still ignore the interactions between legal and non-
legal systems, several notable scholars have started recognizing the role 
of reputational forces across various legal fields. In this Part, I revisit 
specific applications of reputation theory to defamation law, 
international law, and product liability.221 I then explain how my second-
opinion theory adds to the extant law and social norms literature more 
generally. 
A. Applications of Reputation Theory to Specific Legal Fields 
More and more legal scholars recognize the importance of 
reputational concerns, yet stop short of developing a nuanced account of 
how exactly reputation works.222 The second-opinion theory developed 
here can offer a fresh perspective on notable existing accounts. 
1. Defamation Law 
When talking about interactions between law and reputation, most 
legal scholars think about the role of defamation law. On paper, the 
scenario is straightforward: an interested source spreads false allegations 
against a company in an attempt to harm its reputation. The company 
then files a lawsuit against the rumor propagator for defamation. By 
winning a defamation lawsuit the company supposedly vindicates its 
reputation.223 And the threat to punish attackers supposedly deters future 
attackers ex ante. In theory, then, defamation law fulfills a similar and 
more direct role than the second-opinion channel emphasized here, by 
reducing the noise in reputational sanctions. 
For pragmatic and doctrinal reasons, however, the channel of 
defamation law has become very ineffective in affecting reputation.224 
                                                     
221. The area where reputation theory is relied upon most heavily is corporate and securities law. 
I devote a separate article to this subject. Shapira, supra note 90. 
222. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 231, 267 
(2009).  
223. See Robert N. Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 CAL. L. REV. 743, 
744 (1986). 
224. See Ardia, supra note 67, at 304, 315; see, e.g., JENNY RAYNER, MANAGING REPUTATIONAL 
RISK 137 (2003); Shannon M. Heim, The Role of Extra-Judicial Bodies in Vindicating Reputational 
Harm, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 401, 410–12 (2006). 
10 - Shapira.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/18/2016  12:48 PM 
1244 REPUTATION THROUGH LITIGATION [Vol. 91:1193 
 
Sometimes the company cannot win a defamation lawsuit even when the 
accusation against it is inaccurate. Inaccurate reputational sanctions are 
not always the result of some attacker deliberately selling the public 
fabrications and blatantly false rumors. In many cases, inaccuracies stem 
from well-meaning journalists and watchdogs painting an incomplete 
picture—a category that is rarely punished by defamation law.225 At 
other times, even if the company stands a good chance of winning a 
lawsuit, it chooses not to litigate because such a proactive litigious 
strategy will only backfire in the court of public opinion.226 To recast the 
Audi illustration: Audi managers chose not to sue 60 Minutes for airing 
fabricated visualizations because they feared the bad publicity that 
would be generated from mounting such a lawsuit.227 The inadequacy of 
current defamation law to correct reputational sanctions therefore makes 
the second-opinion channel increasingly relevant. 
2. International Law228 
International law scholars invoke the notion of states’ reputation to 
explain the puzzle of compliance. For example, according to Andrew 
Guzman, states obey international legal obligations in order to establish 
reputation as worthy partners to agreements.229 Armed with the insights 
from this Article we can retool the existing reputational theory of 
international law. The existing theory is often read as suggesting that in 
the international relations context, reputation facilitates law: strong 
reputational concerns encourage compliance with legal obligations.230 
But this Article suggests an alternative, upside-down reading: in the 
international arena law facilitates reputation. The law allows better 
signaling of states’ reputation through two channels: clarifying standards 
and providing second opinions. 
First, legal requirements serve in the international arena as well-
known, standardized benchmarks for states’ proper behavior. In other 
words, international law gives third parties a rough proxy against which 
                                                     
225. See DEZENHALL, supra note 63, at 192. 
226. See infra Appendix A: List of Interviews, Interview with Charles Bakaly, Head of the Litig. 
Comm. Dep’t, Edelman (Aug. 21, 2012); Interview with Bill Ide, Partner, McKenna Long & 
Aldridge (Apr. 2, 2014). 
227. See DEZENHALL & WEBER, supra note 57, at 30. 
228. I thank Professors Gabi Blum, Oren Gross, and Billy Magnuson for insightful discussions 
about international law.  
229. GUZMAN, supra note 1, at 33. Even among those criticizing Guzman’s theory, there is a 
consensus that reputation does matter to some extent. Brewster, supra note 222, at 236, 244–49.  
230. GUZMAN, supra note 1, at 33. 
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they can assess which countries are good types that can be trusted. 
Second, international tribunals that adjudicate disputes among states 
produce lagged third-party assessments on how the states behaved,that 
is, whether a treaty was really breached and what the circumstances were 
leading to the alleged breach. Other states that are not part of the dispute 
could then use the information coming from the international tribunal to 
update their beliefs about the disputants’ discount rates more accurately. 
Acknowledging this second-opinion effect of international law explains 
an unsolved puzzle in the existing theory, namely, how outside observers 
know whether a breach of legal obligation is indicative of the breaching 
state’s future behavior. 
Note, however, that international law facilitates better reputational 
sanctioning only for a small subset of disputes. In many areas of 
international law, such as compliance with human rights treaties, there 
are no well-functioning tribunals that adjudicate disputes,231 so the 
second-opinion effect is nonexistent. In other areas, such as use of force, 
the legal standard is very fuzzy and open to interpretation to begin with, 
and so the clarifying-standards effect is irrelevant.232 In areas like 
international trade, by contrast, law enforcement is carried out by 
relatively respectable tribunals such as the World Trade Organization. In 
such areas, reputational sanctions are more effective, all else being 
equal. 
3. Product Liability 
We already discussed one prominent theory that ties reputation to 
product liability law: Polinsky and Shavell’s proposal to reconsider 
product liability.233 The key question in Polinsky and Shavell’s theory is 
how to identify the conditions that make reputational sanctions effective 
for a given product market. Their solution was to focus on one criterion: 
how widely sold the product is.234 Manufacturers of widely sold 
products, the theory goes, know that the market monitors their behavior 
and are therefore disciplined even without the threat of legal liability.235 
But the commonness of a product is a good proxy only if you want to 
                                                     
231. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 
YALE L.J. 1935 (2001) (decrying the lack of effective international human rights adjudication).  
232. See Tarcisio Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law, 106 
n.226, 119, 217 (2005). 
233. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1.  
234. Id. at 1472–73.  
235. Id. 
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measure the quantity of information disseminated, not the quality of 
information. As the examples of Tylenol, Audi, and Odwalla illustrate, 
with widely sold products the widely diffused information may actually 
be distorted. The amount of information disseminated is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for effective reputational sanctions. Other 
conditions that must also be taken into account are the complexity of the 
matter (how observable is the link between effort and quality), and the 
surrounding institutional environment (such as the information generated 
by the legal system). 
More specifically, the analysis so far points to the need to take a 
harder look at the role of regulatory investigations. When Polinsky and 
Shavell examine the role of product liability law in promoting product 
safety, they focus on deterrence by ex post product liability litigation or 
deterrence by ex ante regulatory minimum thresholds.236 But in 
regulated product markets, the legal system also contributes to 
deterrence by facilitating good reputation-information flows. Regulators 
frequently investigate product failures ex post and release a public 
report. It is no coincidence, then, that Polinsky and Shavell listed 
pharmaceuticals and general aviation crafts as two specific product 
markets where reputational control works effectively and can shoulder 
most of the deterrence without resorting to liability litigation.237 Aside 
from widely sold products, these two markets have one thing in 
common: quick and thorough regulatory investigations into product 
failures.238 To illustrate, recall the airplane crashes example: the market 
almost always attributes the failure to the right cause, partly because the 
Federal Aviation Administration releases credible and thorough reports 
quickly. The lesson for policy implications is that before we consider 
scaling back liability litigation, we need to make sure that there is an 
alternative information-producing institution that provides valuable 
second opinions to the market (such as regulatory investigations). 
B. Relation to the Extant Law and Social Norms Literature 
This Article adds to our understanding of the interactions between 
legal and non-legal systems along four basic dimensions. First, the 
Article shows that non-legal systems are costly too (just less 
transparently costly). Legal scholars are usually aware of, and can 
                                                     
236. Id. at 1450–54. 
237. Id. at 1474–76. 
238. See infra Appendix A: List of Interviews, Telephone Interview with Peter Grossi, Drug-
Liability Litigator (Dec. 12, 2012). 
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relatively easily quantify, the costs of legal systems. But the costs of 
non-legal systems are less transparent to us, and we tend to underplay 
them.239 This is especially true with respect to reputational systems, 
where the legal literature suffers from an “indefensible optimism about 
the actual operation of information markets.”240 To be sure, plenty of 
legal scholars have written about problems with reputational sanctions 
(usually in the context of making the case for legal intervention).241 But 
the existing analyses do not elaborate on the full set of social costs that 
accompany reputational sanctions. Specifically, scholars focus almost 
solely on detection costs, suggesting that market players rarely learn 
about corporate failures in real time. But in reality another set of costs—
enforcement costs—also looms large. Even when market players 
become aware of a certain failure, they may under- or over-react.242 
Second, the Article fleshes out how the costs of non-legal systems are 
affected by the legal system. The Article’s most basic contribution is to 
challenge the conventional economic analyses of law and social norms, 
which treat behavior as either law-complying or norm-following.243 The 
Article spotlights the existing interdependencies between legal and non-
legal systems of control, thus illustrating the need to rethink the 
conventional approach and its policy implications. If we scale back the 
background threat of litigation or regulatory investigations, we risk 
increasing the costs of reputational sanctions. The issue of 
complementarities between legal and non-legal systems should therefore 
move from the periphery to the center of the law and social norms 
literature. 
Third, the Article emphasizes a belief-shaping role of the law, instead 
of a preference-shaping role.244 Among the scholars who acknowledge 
that legal and non-legal systems interact, there is a tendency to focus 
more on interactions between law and morals, rather than between law 
and reputation. Under the prevalent approach—sometimes dubbed the 
                                                     
239. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products Liability 
Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1919, 1929–30 (2010). 
240. See Cass R. Sunstein, “She Said What?” “He Did That?” Believing False Rumors 22 (Harv. 
Law Sch., Working Paper No. 08–56, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1304268 [https://perma.cc/ZR5G-U6CP]. 
241. See supra note 63.  
242. The terminology here—and elsewhere in the Article—follows Clark’s typology. Clark, 
supra note 12.  
243. See Talley, supra note 5. 
244. The line between belief- and preference-shaping is murky, however, as is evident from our 
discussion on how non-informative components in verdicts affect stakeholders’ beliefs through 
framing and salience. See DellaVigna & Gentzkow, supra note 38, at 656.  
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“expressive function” of the law—the law affects morals by 
pronouncing the right way to behave, thus facilitating social shaming or 
guilty feelings for those who misbehave.245 I agree with the premise that 
the law affects behavior not just by what it does (sanctions) but also by 
what it says. But I argue that the law does not tell us just what the norms 
are or ought to be, but also whether given norms were violated in 
specific instances. To be sure, my emphasis on an informational role for 
the law does not exclude the possibility of a finger-wagging role for the 
law. The relative strength of each role depends on the context. I 
conjecture that my theory is more relevant in environments with diffused 
and atomistic participants and super-strong economic incentives (think 
publicly traded companies), where it makes sense to highlight 
reputational rather than moral sanctions.246 
Finally, this Article is closely related to recent papers that stress the 
informational role of the law and its effects on reputation.247 My 
approach can be distinguished from these accounts by the answers to 
two key questions: what gap in market knowledge is the legal system 
filling, and how is it filling it? First, other recent accounts usually 
assume that market players are not aware of corporate misconduct, and 
therefore conclude that the role of the legal system is to draw attention to 
previously unnoticed corporate shenanigans.248 My account, by contrast, 
assumes (based on recent empirical evidence)249 that in failures of 
publicly traded companies, market players often learn about and react to 
misconduct before the legal system gets involved. The role of the legal 
system in such cases is to provide second opinions on how things 
happened—reducing the enforcement costs rather than the detection 
costs of reputation systems. Second, other recent accounts tend to focus 
on the informational role of legal outcomes; that is, the signal that legal 
sanctions send to outside observers.250 I, by contrast, focus on 
information disseminated in the process of determining legal outcomes 
                                                     
245. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 
1269–71 (1999). 
246. See also Iacobucci, supra note 5 (noting same).  
247.  See, e.g., id.; Baker & Choi, supra note 5.  
248. See also MACEY, supra note 1, at 12; cf. Fairfax, supra note 69, at 443. 
249. See Karpoff et al., supra note 73. 
250. See Baker & Choi, supra note 5 (firms can opt to submit themselves to formal sanctions and 
thus facilitate better informal control); Iacobucci, supra note 5 (the size of legal sanctions affects the 
reputational signaling equilibrium by affecting firms’ initial decisions whether to commit wrongs or 
not).  
10 - Shapira.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/18/2016  12:48 PM 
2016] REPUTATION THROUGH LITIGATION 1249 
 
(again, following recent empirical evidence showing very little 
correlation between legal and reputational sanctions).251 
CONCLUSION 
The Article’s main original contribution is not to tell us that 
reputation matters or that the law matters for reputation.252 The main 
contribution comes rather from exploring how the law matters for 
reputation. Specifically, the Article narrows two key gaps in the 
conventional approach: showing that reputational sanctions are costly, 
too (just less transparently costly), and explaining how the legal system 
affects the costs of reputational sanctions.253 Recognizing the 
informational role that the law plays in facilitating reputational sanctions 
carries important policy implications—both on a general level 
(cautioning against nonintervention) and on a more specific level 
(rethinking key civil procedure doctrines). 
The broader recurring theme throughout this Article is the focus on 
diffusion of information. Commercial law scholars tend to rely on 
classical economics and agency theory, and this focus has steered them 
away from grappling with informational issues: market players are 
assumed either to have information or not to have it. This Article shifts 
our focus to questions such as how information is diffused (contrary to 
popular belief, information does not fall on individuals like manna from 
the sky), what is the role of information intermediaries, and what types 
of messages are perceived as being more credible than others. 
Specifically, the Article spotlights the important and under-theorized 
role of the media: the magnitude of reputational sanctions is largely 
dictated by the frequency and tenor in which mass media cover the 
failure in question. Evidence suggests that similar acts of corporate 
misconduct (or corporate niceness) receive different amounts of 
attention from the media.254 Importantly, the media’s role is not limited 
                                                     
251. In other words, I use the notion of “shadow of the law” differently: instead of denoting how 
market players consider the backstop of expected legal outcomes they can obtain in the courtroom, I 
use it to denote the backstop of what information will be revealed should the parties’ behavior be 
evaluated in the courtroom. 
252. We already know that. See Karpoff, supra note 2 (providing an overview of the extant 
empirical literature on the reputational outcomes of enforcement events).  
253. Note that the Article’s contributions stand alone. For example, even if you are not convinced 
by my arguments about how the law affects reputation (see supra Part II), you may still find my 
analysis of how reputational sanctions work useful (see supra Part I) because such an account is 
currently missing in the extant literature. 
254. See supra notes 41–42.  
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to monitoring and shining light on issues that would otherwise be less 
salient to outsiders. The media also serve a more direct role in 
influencing reputation, by providing interpretations and judgments on 
known behaviors (think about the typical editorial following a highly 
publicized scandal).255 
It is important to acknowledge that the contributions here represent 
only the first steps toward understanding the vast topic of interactions 
between law and reputation. Considerations of brevity and scope have 
left important angles for future work, such as engaging in more 
quantitative empirical work to test the hypotheses developed here, 
elaborating on the hypotheses’ normative implications, and broadening 
the scope of analysis to incorporate other legal fields and systems. Still, 
the larger conceptual purpose of this Article remains to draw attention to 
the interactions between legal and reputation systems, and to highlight 
the need to design legal institutions with an eye to their reputation-
affecting role. Hopefully the Article represents the beginning of a more 
robust inquiry into the under-studied field of law and reputation. 
 
  
                                                     
255. See Michael K. Bednar, Watchdog or Lapdog? A Behavioral View of the Media as a 
Corporate Governance Mechanism, 55 ACAD. MGMT. J. 131, 131–33 (2012).  
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APPENDIX: LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
In order to capture the fuzzy dynamics of law and reputation, I 
conducted in-depth open conversational interviews with practitioners 
who work on the intersection between the courtroom and the court of 
public opinion. In this type of interview the researcher introduces a topic 
in broad strokes, the interviewee talks freely about the interviewee’s 
experience and insights into the topic, and the researcher further probes 
specific experiences with follow-up questions.256 The iterative process of 
picking practitioners’ brains about holes in existing theories and then 
going back to the drawing board generated some interesting insights. For 
example, almost every interviewee kept bringing up the same theme: the 
information flow from the courtroom to the court of public opinion is 
badly distorted. In other words, they made me rethink my initial theory: 
even if the legal system does manage to produce accurate reputation 
information internally, as I claimed, such information does not 
necessarily reach stakeholders and affect their beliefs. This insight 
redirected my attention, and I began searching for patterns of distortions 
in information flows using other methodologies, such as comparing the 
content of different media outlets. 
This appendix lists only the most helpful and influential interviews in 
each group of practitioners: communication and reputation experts, legal 
experts, and journalists. 
 
Interviews with communication/reputation experts: 
 
E-mail Interview with Eric Dezenhall, President, Dezenhall Res. (July 
2012); 
Telephone Interview with Charles Bakaly, Head of the Litig. 
Commc’n Dep’t, Edelman (Aug. 21, 2012); 
Telephone Interview with Jeff Segal, Founder, MedicalJustice (Nov. 
27, 2012); 
Interview with Michael Fertik, Founder, Reputation.com (Feb. 11, 
2013); and 
Telephone Interview with Rupert Younger, Founder, Oxford Univ. 
Ctr. for Corp. Reputation (May 7, 2014). 
 
                                                     
256. See THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS, supra note 10, at 
127. 
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Interviews with legal experts: 
 
Interview with Richard Clary, Former Head of Litig., Cravath, 
Swaine & Moore, in Cambridge, Mass. (Nov. 16, 2012); 
Telephone Interview with Peter Grossi, Drug-Liability Litigator (Dec. 
12, 2012); 
Telephone Interview with Bruce Carton, Former Senior Counsel, SEC 
Enforcement Dep’t (May 21, 2013); 
Telephone Interview with a Representative of Courtroom Connect 
(June 13, 2013); 
Telephone Interview with Bill Ide, Partner, McKenna Long & 
Aldridge (Apr. 2, 2014); and 
Telephone Interview with Harvey Pitt, Former Chairman, SEC (May 
28, 2014). 
 
Interviews with media experts: 
 
Interview with Guy Rolnik, Founding Editor, TheMarker, in 
Cambridge, Mass. (Nov. 15, 2013); 
Telephone Interview with Kim Masters, Entm’t Journalist (June 14, 
2013); 
Telephone Interview with Kim Christensen, Journalist, L.A. TIMES 
(Jan. 17, 2014); 
Telephone Interview with Corie Brown, Journalist, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 
20, 2014); and 
Telephone Interview with Richard Verrier, Journalist, L.A. TIMES 
(Jan. 23, 2014). 
 
